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COMMENT
A PROPOSED RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS FOR
RESTRICTIONS ON DISTRIBUTION
INTRODUCTION

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.1 is fast becoming one of
the most controversial decisions in antitrust history. In the first such decision
this century to overrule a major Supreme Court precedent, the majority
struck down the sales-agency distinction which had been established in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 2 only ten years before to determine
the legality of vertical territorial restrictions. The primary significance of
Sylvania is that it directs the courts to turn away from the factitious,
formalistic categories previously used to determine the legality of distribution
restrictions. 3 Henceforth, courts must focus their inquiry on the underlying
question of competitiveness4 rather than on formal classifications. s Sylvania
requires a showing of "demonstrable economic effect" to justify "departure
from the rule-of-reason." 6 Reversal of the Schwinn decision, in which the
Court reached its pinnacle in permitting the form of a transaction to dictate
lawfulness, was an important first step toward an approach which allows
businessmen to justify restrictions on distribution on the basis of competitive
pressures.
In making this step, the Sylvania decision requires a new rule of reason test
designed to permit businessmen to show what competitive pressures they face.
The first purpose of this Comment, therefore, is to propose a functional rule
of reason test to be applied in vertical territorial restrictions, the only type of
distribution restriction which currently may be analyzed under this rule. To
this end, Part I will briefly review the history of trade restraint litigation
leading up to Sylvania to show how formalistic distinctions developed and
how the result of modern cases depends upon the form of the restraint in
question. This review will also show the need for a new test directed at
competitive impact rather than form. Then, in an effort to establish a
foundation for the proposed test, Part II will discuss economic theories
relevant to the resolution of restraint of trade cases under section 1 of the
1.
2.

433 U.S. 36 (1977).
388 U.S. 365 (1967). Territorial restraints imposed on a dealer pursuant to a sale were

deemed to be per se unlawful, though the same restraints imposed in an agency situation could be
potentially lawful. Id. at 375. The Sylvania Court listed a large number of articles criticizing
Schwinn. 433 U.S. at 48 n.13.
3. Restrictions on distribution include: resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, location
clauses, and customer restraints, whether vertically or horizontally imposed.
4. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-92 (1978).
Although this case did not involve restrictions on distribution, it reaffirms the notion that
competitiveness must be the central issue in questions of restraints of trade. Unfortunately, the
decision does not explain how the competitiveness issue should be analyzed. See notes 143-44
infra and accompanying text.
5. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 58-59.
6. Id.
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Sherman Act (the Act). 7 The test itself is proposed in Part III, and, in Part
IV, the Schwinn and Sylvania fact patterns will be analyzed to demonstrate
the mechanics of the test.
Hopefully, Sylvania will pave the way for future decisions abandoning
formalistic distinctions in distribution restriction cases. Although the Court
criticized such distinctions, it preserved in dicta two substantial vestiges of the
formalistic approachs-the distinctions between horizontal and vertical restrictions and between price and nonprice restraints. The fundamental issue
with respect to horizontal relationships 9 and resale price maintenance' 0 has
always been whether the restraints are so inherently pernicious that they must
necessarily have a negative impact on competition." The second purpose of
this Comment is to demonstrate that many such restraints are procompetitive.
Thus, Part V will show that the rule of reason analysis proposed below can
apply to practices classified as horizontal or to agreements involving resale
price maintenance to determine the legality of the restraint in question. Unlike
a per se approach, a workable rule of reason test can distinguish procompetitive and anticompetitive restraints.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRECEDENT
The sweeping language of section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations."1 2 The early view was that Congress intended that the statute
3
be construed literally so as to condemn all contracts restraining trade.1
Realizing, however, that every contract restrains trade to some degree,' 4 later
courts concluded "that Congress did not intend to prohibit all contracts, nor
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
8. According to the Court, the Sylvania decision did not affect horizontal restraints, 433 U.S.
at 58 n.28, or price maintenance, id. at 51 n.18.
9. Agreements among firms that ordinarily would compete among themselves or that operate
at the same market level involve horizontal relationships. For example, in United States v. Scaly,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), a group of mattress manufacturers formed a trademark licensing
corporation in order to allocate exclusive territories and fix prices among themselves. Because
they were potential competitors, the arrangement was found to be horizontal. Id. at 352; see 28
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 457, 461-62 (1971).
10. In a resale price maintenance arrangement, manufacturers set the price at which their
product must be resold by wholesalers or retailers or the price below which their products may
not be resold. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911); F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 512 (1970).
11. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), discussed at note 19 illfra and
accompanying text.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
13. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n. 166 U.S. 290, 291-304 (1897), eighteen
railroads operating west of the Mississippi established a freight rate schedule to prevent
competitive forces from reducing rates to a below-cost level. The cartel, however, imposed no
restrictions affecting market share or potential customers. The Court applied the "plain and
ordinary meaning of [the] language" of the Act, id. at 328, to find the railroad-rate cartel illegal.
Id. at 291-304.
14. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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even all contracts that might in some insignificant degree or attenuated sense

restrain trade or competition." 1 5 Justice White wrote in Standard Oil Co. v.

United States16 that congressional intent was to hold unlawful only those
agreements and combinations which unduly restrain interstate or foreign
commerce and that the standard for determining whether the statute has been
violated is the standard of reason.1 7 This standard, which came to be known
as the rule of reason, is described in the oft-cited language of Justice Brandeis:
"Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.... The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition."' 8
Notwithstanding the pronouncements that a reasonableness standard be
used in determining the legality of restraints on trade, the Court made clear in
Northern Pacific Railway v. United States that not all cases are subject to
such a standard:
[C]ertain agreements or practices ... because of their pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use. This [is the] principle of per se unreasonableness
19

Therefore, under a per se rule the complainant need show only that defendants engaged in a prohibited practice. This practice is automatically deemed
to be illegal even absent proof of an antisocial or anticompetitive effect.20
15. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972). The progression to the less
literal interpretation expressed in Topco began one year after United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), see note 13 supra, in a case of similar facts, United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 558 (1898). The Joint Traffic Court rejected defendants'
argument that cartels were necessary to prevent monopoly, id. at 576-77, saying that an
agreement "which directly and effectually stifles competition, must be regarded under the statute
as one in restraint of trade." Id. at 577. For the first time the Court recognized that restrictions
with only indirect and incidental effects on competition could potentially be lawful. Id. at 568.
The Court's rationale was based partly on the circuit court opinion of United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), in which Judge Taft wrote
that all restraints are unlawful except those "merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful
contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the
contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party."
Id. at 282. Conversely, if the main purpose is to restrain competition, nothing will justify the
restraint. Id. at 282-83. The Supreme Court majority did not mention the ancillary doctrine in
resolving Addyston, but the Joint Traffic Court referred to the doctrine favorably. 171 U.S. at
560; L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, § 64, at 171 (1977).
16. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
17. Id. at 60; accord, National Socy of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 (1978).
18. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
19. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
20. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972); United States v. Container
Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 340 (1969) (Mfarshall, J., dissenting); see United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-23 (1940); F. Scherer, supra note 10, at 428.
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Vertical Restraints

A vertical relationship exists when firms operating at different market
strata act in concert. At the upper end of the system is the market supplier,
usually a manufacturer. The bottom stratum is comprised of dealers or
retailers. When the entire marketing system is comprised of only these two
layers, it is referred to as a two-tier system. When an intermediate level exists,
comprised of wholesalers or distributors, the system is said to be three-tiered.
These two arrangements are the most common, but other multi-tier arrangements exist as well.
1.

Resale Price Maintenance

With regard to resale price maintenance generally, a review of the cases
reveals three basic patterns-those involving agreements between the market
supplier and distributors and/or dealers, 21 those imposed unilaterally, 22 and
those imposed pursuant to an agency-consignment contract. 23 The outcome of
any challenge to a resale price maintenance program will depend on the
program's classification into one of these three categories.
In the first situation, the courts have found an intent among dealers to form
a cartel 24 and have held these arrangements per se illegal. 2 5 The second
category, in contrast, occurs when the price maintenance is imposed unilaterally, as in United States v. Colgate & Co. ,26 which upheld the announcement
of a price maintenance policy and a simple refusal to deal with noncomplying
dealers.27 The facts of Colgate, however, will be very difficult to duplicate in
a three-tier market system 28 and are not easy to duplicate in a two-tier market
21. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), the market
supplier had fixed minimum resale prices of both wholesalers and retailers. The program required
the signing of contracts that would ensure the maintenance of the price structure. Id. at 374-81.
22. In United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the market supplier unilaterally
refused to sell to dealers failing to charge a suggested retail price.
23. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1926).
24. See pt. II(A) infra.
25. E.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The
decision in Dr. Miles borrowed the logic of Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
211 (1899), in which a horizontal cartel was condemned. The Court likened the Dr. Miles
arrangement to a horizontal cartel and condemned it per se without finding collusion between the
market supplier and the dealers. 220 U.S. at 408; see notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
Professor Posner points out that the Dr. Miles Court did not actually claim that the manufacturer
was acting as an agent for a dealer cartel but nevertheless treated the case as if this were so.
Posner postulates that, although the Court stated that all benefits of retail price maintenance inure
to the dealer, some restrictions could result in some benefit to the manufacturer to which it was
not entitled. R. Posner, Antitrust Law 151-53 (1976).
26. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
27. Id. at 307. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does
not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."
Id.; see note 22 supra.
28. The Colgate doctrine was limited by United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960), which stands for the proposition that market suppliers cannot utilize wholesalers to police
a resale price maintenance policy imposed on retailers. In a policing arrangement the market
supplier's conduct is no longer unilateral but is cooperative and, therefore, equivalent to an express
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system.2 9 Generally, when a supplier engages in a program of refusing to
deal, some extra activity"on the part of the market supplier, such as policing,
enables the court to find an implied agreement. 30 The Court in Albrecht v.
Herald Co. 3 1 found more than a mere announcement and simple refusal to
deal on the part of the market supplier in this two-tier market situation. This
case was a further setback to resale price maintenance in that retail price
ceilings were held illegal despite the arrangement's purpose of maintaining
lower prices. 3 2 Consignment arrangements, the third category, will be per se
illegal if they involve coercion. 33 Even in the absence of coercion, resale price
34
maintenance in agency or consignment situations is probably suspect.
or implied agreement suppressing competition. Id. at 40-41, 44. The Parke, Davis decision was
probably colored by the fact that the case had strong overtones of boycott-in and of itself a per
se violation. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). Parke, Davis is difficult to reconcile with Colgate, which allows
announcement and followthrough of a suggested retail price program. If the supplier uses
wholesalers to police retailers, however, the program is per se illegal. Thus, a market supplier
must police its resale price maintenance program itself. The only suppliers capable of doing this
are those large enough to own their own wholesale network, that is, those large enough to operate
in a two-tier system. If the market supplier lacks the wherewithal to handle its own wholesale
distribution and, therefore, works within a three-tier system, it will be unable to enforce its
announced policy and will be placed at a disadvantage compared with its larger competitors. L
Posner, supra note 25, at 155.
29. In a two-tier arrangement, one must beware of overzealous manufacturer representatives
whose actions might transfer a unilaterally imposed suggested retail price program into an
agreement to maintain prices.
30. In FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 454-56 (1922), for e'ample, Beech-Nut
secured the cooperation of distributors and dealers by having company agents and complying
dealers identify and report dealers who were unwilling to comply with Beech-Nut's price policy.
The Court found this arrangement to be no different from an express or implied agreement to
achieve the same result. Similarly, in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707,
723 (1944), the Court found a conspiracy in the utilization of wholesalers to control retailers'
compliance, even though the company and the wholesalers had no express agreement.
31. 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Because Albrecht, an independent newspaper carrier handling
home delivery, sold newspapers for more than the set maximum price, the publisher exercised his
reserved right to compete with home deliverers who refused to comply with contract terms. The
publisher subsequently obtained about 25% of Albrecht's customers and assigned them to a new
carrier. By the time Albrecht brought suit, his contract had been terminated. Forced to sell his
route with only 75% of his customers, Albrecht claimed to have suffered a loss. Id. at 147-48.
The Court found an illegal combination between the new carrier and the publisher, analogizing
the case to Parke, Davis. Id. at 149-50.
32. Id. at 152-53.
33. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964). Prior to Simpson, the Court had upheld
a resale price maintenance program in a consignment arrangement that was free of coercion.
United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). Simpson involved an arrangement
whereby a refiner sold gasoline on a so-called consignment basis to various service station dealers.
Unlike a standard consignment arrangement, however, the refiner forced essential indicia of
ownership, such as risk of loss and payment of insurance, upon the dealers. Furthermore, if
dealers did not adhere to the set resale price, their annual leases to the service stations were not
renewed. 377 U.S. at 24.
34. Professor Averill rightly finds the Simpson opinion elusive: "The only sure conclusion
which can be made is ... that upon [a] review of all the facts of the case, Simpson had shown an
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Sylvania, which overruled the sales-agency distinction used to determine the
legality of a vertical territorial restraint, 3" probably undermines the consignment distinction made with regard to resale price maintenance as well.
2.

Nonprice Restrictions

Three of the most commonly employed vertical nonprice restrictions 36 are
the closed or exclusive territory, 37 the unauthorized outlet or dealer location
clause, 38 and the customer restriction. 39 Prior to Schwinn, the Supreme Court
had taken a liberal view toward such restrictions. In White Motor Co. v.
United States,4 0 for example, the market supplier had imposed closed territorial and customer restraints in vertical franchise agreements with its dealers. 4 1
In refusing to sustain summary judgment against the market supplier, the
Court said:
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which [vertical
territorial restrictions] emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction or
they may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business ...and within
the 'rule of reason.' We need to know more . . . about the actual impact of these

arrangements on competition to decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on
competition and lack . .'.any redeeming virtue' . . 42
. [that they) therefore should be
classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act.
In contrast to the White Motor Court's focus on the competitive impact of
the restriction, the Court later took a formalistic approach in Schwinn. In
that case the market supplier had imposed customer and territorial restraints
actionable wrong under the antitrust laws." Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An
Analysis and Prognosis, 15 N.Y.L.F. 39, 43 (1969) (footnote omitted). At a minimum, however,
courts can be expected to take a close look at any resale price maintenance situation. Id.

35. See notes 50-54 infra and accompanying text.
36. Averill, supra note 34, at 62.
37. In such an arrangement, the dealer has an exclusive right to operate within a territory.
The market supplier relies upon the dealer's knowledge of and familiarity with the locale to
determine the amount of sales effort, locations, and sales help necessary to develop the territory.
38. The market supplier in this situation allocates locations from which dealers may distribute
its goods but leaves the dealers with less discretion as to coverage of territory. Courts generally
view this type of restriction as less restrictive than exclusive territories in that these practices do
not altogether eliminate intrabrand competition within each territory. Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 59-60 (White, J., concurring).
39. Unlike other territorial restrictions, which are imposed upon vendors, the customer restraint places the restriction upon vendees in that the market supplier limits the customers with
whom the retailer may deal. Specifically, the dealer is restricted either as to class of customer,
that is, to particular retailers or wholesalers, or as to the location of the ultimate customer. As a
result, a dealer may be unable to sell to an out-of-territory customer even though the customer
approaches the dealer in his own territory. Of the nonprice restraints, customer restrictions will
generally have the greatest impact on competition, and courts, therefore, evaluate them cautiously.
See id. at 60-63.
40. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
41. Id. at 255-56.
42. Id. at 263 (citations omitted). The Court deferred judgment on whether a rule of reason or
per se rule should be applied until the case was heard on its merits. Id. at 261; R. Posner, supra
note 25, at 159.
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upon its licensed dealers and distributors. 43 The purpose of the restraints was
to ensure that Schwinn bicycles were sold to consumers only through carefully
chosen dealers. All of the dealers were bicycle repair shops whom the
market supplier considered capable of providing vital services necessary to
maintain the product's quality image and consumer satisfaction. 44 Rather
than looking to the competitive impact of the restraint to determine whether a
per se rule should be applied, the Court distinguished between bicycles sold to
distributors for resale to dealers and those sold directly to dealers through a
distributor-agent of Schwinn. In the first situation, because the market
supplier had parted with title to and dominion over the bicycles, the majority
reasoned that the Schwinn restrictions were a substantial restraint on alienation and therefore per se unlawful. When title did not pass from Schwinn, as
in the second situation, the restraints were to be tested for reasonableness. 4 5
The Schwinn holding had serious consequences both for the state of the law
and for businessmen. From a legal point of view, courts were faced with the
proposition that the same restriction imposed by the same market supplier on
the same dealer could potentially be reasonable or, depending on the form of
the transaction, have so pernicious an effect on competition as to be per se
unlawful.4 6 From a business standpoint, market suppliers would have
difficulty preventing undesirable dealers from improperly selling the supplier's
goods unless they were large enough to integrate vertically or to sell to
consumers through dealers on a consignment basis.
Prior to Schwinn, courts often found vertical restraints to be per se illegal
by analogizing the agreements between the supplier and his dealers to a
horizontal conspiracy. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons
Co., 47 the fundamental precedent for extending the per se rule from horizontal
conspiracy cases to vertical cases, the Court said that the market supplier
could "fare no better with its plan of identical contracts than could the dealers
themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to establish the
same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with
each other." 48 It was on this basis that Professor Posner criticized the
Schwinn decision, arguing that in relying upon restraint on alienation the
Court departed from the rationale used in deciding Dr. Miles. 49Furthermore,
restraint on alienation is not protected by the Sherman Act.
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Sylvania specifically overruled Schwinn and
43.

388 U.S. at 370-71. For a more detailed discussion of the Schwinn restrictions, see notes

199-208 infra and accompanying text.

44. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 335 (N.D. Inl. 1965S) aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
45. 388 U.S. at 379-80.
46. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 243, 271 (1975).
47. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), discussed at notes 21, 25 supra and accompanying text. The
Court's reasoning in applying a per se rule in Dr. Miles applies equally to nonprice restraints.
48. Id. at 408.
49. R. Posner, supra note 25, at 163. A multitude of authorities have criticized Schuinn as
being irrelevant to the question of competition, based on a faulty legal precedent, and in itself
detrimental to competition. Editorial Note, Territorial and Customer Restrictions: A Trend
Toward a Broader Rule of Reason?, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 123, 131 & nn.66, 67 & 68 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Broader Rule of Reason].
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held that territorial restrictions are not illegal per se even if imposed pursuant
to a sales contract.5 0 In abandoning the status of title distinction as a criterion
of legality, the Court intends that a rule of reason analysis based upon
demonstrable economic effect,-" that is, impact on competition,5 2 be employed to determine whether the Sherman Act has been violated. Furthermore, a per se prohibition is justified only when the threshold of economic
harm set forth in Northern Pacific5 3 is reached. 5 4 At present, therefore,
vertically imposed nonprice restraints must be tested under a reasonableness
standard to determine their true impact on competition. Some plaintiffs, on
the other hand, will attempt to color the nonprice restraints as an overall
scheme to fix prices or as an agreement that is horizontal in nature in order to
bring the restraint under a per se prohibition. 55
B. HorizontalRestraints
A horizontal relationship exists between firms that operate at the same
market stratum, that is, in competition with one another. Such a relationship could include combinations of two or more market suppliers, two or
more distributors, or two or more dealers. A horizontal relationship may also
exist when firms from different market strata operate at the same level with
respect to the restriction in question. A market supplier and its dealers may
operate at the same level if the supplier sells directly to consumers as well as
to dealers in a so-called dual distribution arrangement. Courts have
found
56
such dual distribution arrangements to be horizontal in nature.
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 7 and its progeny created a
strict rule of per se illegality for horizontal restraints.58 The rationale for
applying the per se rule was that the party initiating the restraint usually had
a purpose of lessening competition at the same level of distribution as those
50. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 58.
51. Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 685, 686 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (interpreting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
52. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-92 (1978).
53. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
54. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.. 433 U.S. at 57-58.
55. See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130-31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 340 (1978).
56. In United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 307-08 (1956), even though
the relationship of defendant to its distributors was vertical, the nature of the restraints was
horizontal in that the defendant operated at the same market level as its franchisees who were
subject to a resale price maintenance policy. In American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
521 F.2d 1230, 1254 (3d Cir. 1975), defendant's foreclosure of its franchisees from operating
Holiday Inns or other motels in cities where defendant operated an inn without its permission
constituted "market allocation agreements among competitors." A horizontal division of markets
was found to exist between the market supplier and its licensees in Hobart Brothers Co. v.
Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894, 899 (5th Cr.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973),
because the firms also were rival distributors.
57. 175 U.S. 211 (1899), discussed at note 15 supra.
58. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 58 n.28 ("no doubt" that
horizontal restraints are per se illegal); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963) (horizontal restraints "are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition").
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agreeing to the restraint.5 9 Furthermore, in United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 60 the Court held that reasonableness of price was not a relevant defense
to a Sherman Act attack on an agreement to fix or maintain prices. 6' "The
aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination
of one form of competition." 6 2 In so holding, the Court distinguished price63
fixing cases from other cases in which a rule of reason had been applied.
The Court, however, neglected to consider the ability of the defendants to
carry out the price restraint policy. In addition, adherence to the policy was
the exception, not the rule. 6 4 Nonetheless, this case is considered the keystone
of price-fixing precedent. 65 Whenever a horizontal restraint could be classified
6
as involving price fixing, it was deemed to be per se unlawful. "
Per se liability for horizontal restrictions on distribution evolved from cases
involving aggregations of trade restraints.6 7 In United States v. Sealy, Inc.,6"
for example, it was the aggregation of Sealy's territorial restraints with
unlawful price fixing that was fatal to the entire program.6 9 The Court would
not analyze each restraint separately; rather, the entire plan was condemned
because it included an element of price fixing. 70 Prior to United States v.
Topco Associates, 7 1 the Supreme Court had never considered horizontal
territorial restraints unaggregated with any other restrictions. 72 In this case,
the per se rule, originally developed for the evils of price fixing, was extended
to territorial restraints solely because they were horizontally imposed, and the
59. Comment, Restricted DistributionAfter "Schwinn", 9 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 1032,
1040 & n.44 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Restricted Distribution].
60. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
61. Id. at 396.
62. Id. at 397.
63. See id. at 396-98; F. Scherer, supra note 10, at 430.
64. F. Scherer, supra note 10, at 430.
65. Id. Six years after this case, the Court departed from the per se rule in finding price
restraints imposed by a trade association for 137 coal producers reasonable in light of the
depression's effect on the coal industry. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933). The Court was influenced by the defendants' lack of power to fix prices for the entire
industry; there was still competition from nonmembers. The restraints were seen primarily as
abuse-correcting measures and thus reasonable. Id. at 373-74. The case, however, has not been
given status as precedent. F. Scherer, supra note 10, at 431.
66. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the majority reiterated
the proposition that price fixing had always been unlawful; a showing of competitive evils to be
corrected is not a defense. Id. at 218-21. It is noteworthy that in making this statement, the Court
discounted its prior holding in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933),
discussed at note 65 supra.
67. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), and Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211
(1899), all involved market divisions aggregated with price fixing.
68. 388 U.S. 350 (1967). In this case, a group of mattress manufacturers had formed a
trademark-holding corporation through which they allocated territories and set resale prices.
69. Id. at 357.
70. Id. at 356-57.
71. 405 U.S. 596 (1972), discussed in pt. V(A)(2) infra. Topco involved a trademark-holding
corporation used by a group of small grocery chains to buy high quality private label products.
Although the cooperative allocated territories among its members, it did not set prices.
72. BroaderRule of Reason, supra note 49, at 142; 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 457, 465 (1971).
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reasonableness of the restraints was considered irrelevant. 73 In an attempt
to explain the harshness of its decision, the majority noted that courts are not
74
adept at weighing difficult economic criteria to determine reasonableness.
It is worthy of note, however, that in deciding Sealy, the Court stated: "We
seek the central substance of the situation, not its periphery . . . .
From the
context in which this statement was made, however, it is evident that the
Court intended to focus its inquiry on the identity, that is, market levels, of the
parties participating in the restraint. 76 The unfortunate result of such an
approach is that the inquiry nevertheless focuses on form-the identity of the
actors-rather than substance-the objective of the parties in initiating the
restraints. 77
"

C. Resulting Focus on Form Over Substance
As shown above, the form of the relationship of the parties to the
restraint-vertical or horizontal-or the form of the restraint itself-price or
nonprice-determines whether a rule of reason or a per se rule applies.
Horizontal restraints involving territorial and customer allocation and probably all price-related restraints are per se unlawful. The only distribution
restraints that certainly are analyzed under the rule of reason are vertical
nonprice restraints. It is possible, however, that Sylvania marks the beginning of a movement toward substantive analysis in distribution restraint
cases. In its decision, the Court stated that the Schwinn restraints had not
satisfied the NorthernPacific test 78 and that "departure from the rule-of-reason
standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . .
upon formalistic line drawing. ' 79 Nevertheless, the Court unequivocally
stated in the same decision that horizontal territorial restraints are illegal per
se.8 0 No economic theory, however, was offered to support this statement
despite its inconsistency with the Court's holding. 8 1 Although differences in
competitive impact may flow from the fact that a restraint is horizontally
imposed, it is not altogether clear that all such restraints should be subject to
a per se rule. In any event, notwithstanding the pronouncements that
substance is more important than form and that departures from the rule of
reason must be based on demonstrable economic effect, formalistic line
drawing is still an important part of litigation involving restrictions on
distribution.
73. 405 U.S. at 608.
74. Id. at 609-10.
75. 388 U.S. at 353 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. Even though Sealy, Inc. had a vertical relationship with its members, the Court
reasoned that the corporation was merely the instrumentality of its licensees. Therefore, even
though the form of the agreement among the parties was vertical, it was in substance horizontal.
77. R. Posner, supra note 25, at 165-66.
78. "Certainly, there has been no showing ... that vertical [territorial] restrictions have or
are likely to have a 'pernicious effect on competition' or that they 'lack . . . any redeeming
virtue."' 433 U.S. at 58 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S, 1, 5 (1958)).
79. Id. at 58-59.
80. Id. at 58 n.28.
81. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 9 n.26 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Reflections on Sylvanla].
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One reason offered in support of formal distinctions is that they provide
businessmen with predictable guidelines to help determine what conduct will
violate the Act.8 2 Although this is true in extreme cases, the distinctions
drawn between different types of restraints are not always manifestly clear.
For example, it is difficult to determine whether a vertical restraint has
horizontal elements8 3 or whether territorial restraints coupled with a manufacturer's suggested resale price is resale price maintenance. Thus, in practice, distinctions between different types of restraints may be hard to define,
and, as such, these distinctions provide no more predictability than does a rule
of reason approach. Moreover, generic distinctions do not go to the intent of
the Act.84 If the Court were to apply its rule of demonstrable economic effect
across the board, businessmen would at least have the opportunity to show
that their actions were meant to enhance their competitive viability.
11.

ECONOMIC THEORIES UNDERLYING RESTRICTIONS ON DISTRIBUTION

Before establishing a test to be employed in determining the reasonableness
of restrictions on distribution, it is essential to understand the economic
theories that have historically influenced trade restraint litigation. The underlying question with respect to all restraints is: Why would a market supplier

want to restrict competition among dealers?85 It would seem that greater
competition at the retail level would mean lower prices to the consumer. Sales
should increase as prices decrease, resulting in greater volume for the market
supplier. 86 Moreover, the market supplier has an inherent desire to maintain
a low cost of distribution-the difference between his price to the dealer and
the dealer's price to the consumer 8 7-in order to encourage greater sales
volume. 88 The apparent illogic of restrictions on distribution imposed by
market suppliers has been explained on the basis of two economic theoriesthe dealer-cartel theory and the dealer-services theory. 9
A.

The Dealer-CartelTheory

Until the Sylvania decision, the prevailing economic theory guiding traderestraint litigation was the dealer-cartel theory. This theory presupposes that
82. See F. Scherer, supra note 10, at 439.
83. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. Some courts have declined to find horizontal
arrangements even though market suppliers competed on the same level as their dealers. See
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 260-61 (1963); Johnson & Johnson v. Avenue
Merchandise Corp., 193 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Coca Cola Co., [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,010 (FTC initial decision, Oct. 8, 1975), discussed at notes
119, 237 infra. Because certain agreements will be considered essentially vertical, while very
similar agreements will be deemed to be horizontal, meaningful guidelines are not available to
businesses seeking to remain within the boundaries of the law.
84. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 58-59
85. R. Posner, supra note 25, at 147; Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want FairTradel, 3
J.L. & Econ. 86 (1960).
86. R. Posner, supra note 25, at 147-48; Telser, supra note 85, at 86.
87. Telser, supra note 85, at 91.
88. R_ Posner, supra note 25, at 147-48.
89. Id. at 148.
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dealers form associations for the purpose of restricting competition among
themselves. In furtherance of this purpose, dealers use their market supplier
as the instrument of their cartelization. 90 Dealers who have sufficient market
power may be able to influence manufacturers-probably under threat of
losing valuable retail outlets-to allow the dealers to set monopoly prices by
imposing "vertical" restrictions on distribution. 9 A simplified version of this
agreement might exist when there is no principal market supplier, thus
making the agreement truly horizontal. 92 Consider, for example, a situation in
which six manufacturers of iron pipe, who are also involved in retail sales,
agree to eliminate competition among themselves. They accomplish their
desired goal by fixing prices and allocating territories. 93 An arrangement in
pursuit of cartelization such as this one would, according to Judge Taft's
94
opinion in Addyston, violate the Sherman Act.
The dealer-cartel theory is deeply rooted in antitrust precedent and has
been used by courts to justify per se rulings. The first case to apply the
dealer-cartel theory to vertical restraints 95 was Dr. Miles, 96 in which the Court
said: "[T]he advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the
dealers. The enlarged profits which would result from adherence to the
established rates would go to them and not to the [market supplier]." 97 The
Court went on to say that, under the antitrust laws, the market supplier could
fare no better than the dealers if they themselves had formed the combination
to achieve the same result. 98 As a result, later cases involving restraints of the
same form were not analyzed, for substance.
As recently as Albrecht v. Herald Co.,99 the dealer-cartel theory surfaced
again-this time in the dissent. In this case, the defendant newspaper
publisher allocated exclusive territories to newspaper deliverers in exchange
for a promise not to exceed maximum resale prices. The majority found this
arrangement to be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 100 In his
dissent, Justice Harlan succinctly explained the dealer-cartel theory as follows:
Resale price maintenance, a practice not involved here, lessens horizontal intrabrand
competition. The effects ...are the same whether the price maintenance policy takes
the form of a horizontal conspiracy among resellers or of vertical dictation by a
manufacturer plus reseller acquiescence. This means . . . it is frequently possible to
infer a combination of resellers behind what is presented to the world as a vertical and

90.

Id.

91. Id.; Telser, supra note 85, at 88.
92. E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
93. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 212-13 (1899).
94. 85 F. 271, 292-94 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); accord, L. Sullivan, supra
note 15, § 64, at 170.

95.

R. Posner, supra note 25, at 151.

96.

See notes 21, 25 supra and accompanying text.

97.

220 U.S. at 407.

98. Id. at 408.
99. 390 U.S. 145, 157-59 (1968).
100. Id. at 148-50; see notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
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unilateral price policy, because it10l
is the resellers and not the manufacturer who reap
the direct benefits of the policy.
On the basis of this rationale, Justice Harlan argued that setting a price
ceiling could not be equated with setting a price floor via a "combination of
resellers" or with a dealer cartel because price ceilings do not provide excess
profits to the dealers.102 Therefore, he claimed that a per se rule is not
justified in such a case because it is inconsistent with the dealer-cartel
03
precedent giving rise to the per se rule in vertical price maintenance cases. 1
Thus, no intent to cartelize or lessen competition could be inferred in
Albrecht, as it had been in the earlier cases.
B. The Dealer-ServicesTheory
Another theory that explains why restrictions on distribution are imposed is
the dealer-services theory.' 0 4 Unlike the dealer-cartel theory, however, this
theory may serve as justification for finding the restraints reasonable. The
rationale of the dealer-services theory is that the market supplier imposes
restrictions on distribution in an attempt to increase nonprice competition
among its dealers to stimulate sales of its product at the retail level.""° For
example, the dealer may be given an exclusive territory to induce him to
allocate resources to the territory's development, or a resale price may be set
06
at a level high enough to cover the dealer's costs in providing sales services.'
This nonprice competition usually takes the form of presale, 0 7 point-ofsale,' 08 and postsale' 0 9 services which dealers offer to customers to promote
sales and to ensure satisfaction with the product. These services could
include: maintaining a large showroom for adequate display of the product;
stocking an extensive inventory to satisfy consumer demand; carrying an
adequate spare or component part inventory; training sales personnel to
instruct consumers as to proper product usage; employing and training repair
personnel; purchasing tools to provide proper repair or servicing; and implementing local advertising. "10 Consider, for example, Professor Bork's national
gas station chain hypothetical.'
Provision of services is an essential part of
the national marketing campaign because the main product, gasoline, is
fungible. Furthermore, the national chains seem unable to undercut the
independent operations. 112 Therefore, in order for a national chain to compete
101. 390 U.S. at 157 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 157-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 162-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
104. See R. Posner, supra note 25, at 16S-66.
105. Id. at 148; Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 4; Telser, supra note 85, at 91.
106. See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
107. Telser, supra note 85, at 91.
108. R. Posner, supra note 25, at 148.
109. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 55.
110. See id.; R. Posner, supra note 25, at 148; Bark, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Concept: PriceFixing and Market Division (pt. I), 75 Yale L.J. 373, 454-55 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Bork II]; Telser, supra note 85, at 91.
111. Bork I1, supra note 110, at 454-56.
112. See Nazem, A Penny-pinching Strategy Pays Off at the Gas Pumps, Fortune, June 5,
1978, at 140. Many of the larger independents have kept services at a minimum for the purpose
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effectively, its dealers may have to provide many auxiliary services. One such
service is repair work, which requires at least one full-time mechanic, approreplacement parts, and a garage in which the
priate tools, an inventory of
13
repair work can be done."
One might question why a national gas company would not allow individual dealers to determine the number of services they would offer.1 1 4 The main
reason is that the refiner's brand appeal on a national level depends upon
uniformity of product and service.1"5 The uniformity assures customers that
they can expect quality products and services wherever they travel. Furthermore, traveling motorists who have been satisfied with the service of several
of the refiner's dealers may be inclined to patronize their local dealers regularly. " 6 The dealer-services theory, therefore, justifies more lenient treatment
under the Sherman Act for restrictions imposed to encourage services that are
an essential
complement to the refiner's national advertising and marketing
1 17
efforts.

The dealer-services theory also recognizes that restraints on distribution
may be necessary to protect dealers who supply valuable services to customers
from other dealers who may try to obtain a free ride. 1 8 Consider, for
example, a dealer who has made a substantial investment in local advertising
to develop sales of a market supplier's product. These advertising costs must
be incorporated into the dealer's resale price. If dealers competing in the same
product were able to invade the market of the industrious dealer, they would
not have to pay the costs of market development. The competitors, therefore,
would be able to undercut the price of the dealer who had developed the
market and would have a free ride on the goodwill generated for the product.
Such unrestrained market incursions would deter local dealers from developing markets because recoupment of their investments would be subject to
great risk. ' 9
of undercutting the majors. Customers of these cut-rate operations must pay in cash rather than
credit cards, pump their own gas, and go elsewhere for repairs.
113. Even the simple service of repairing flat tires requires not only the appropriate supplies
but also an adequate number of personnel to perform the service and to keep the gas pump
working at the same time. The market supplier might also demand clean restroom facilities on
each location thus requiring commercial space, maintenance, and supplies.
114. See Bork II, supra note 110, at 455.
115. Id. Another reason is that the refiner might trust his own business judgment more than
that of the service station operators. Id.
116. Id. at 455-56. The dealer, however, benefits primarily from local customers; he will not
be able to determine which customers are local and, therefore, potential repeaters. Id. at 456 n.161.
117. See id. at 474-75.
118. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 55; R. Posner, supra note
25, at 149; Bork II, supra note 110, at 453-54; Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 6-7;
Telser, supra note 85, at 91.
119. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 55. An excellent example
of the danger of free-rider incursion appeared in a recent case before the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) involving the Coca Cola Company. As part of its overall marketing policy,
Coca Cola allocates to its bottlers exclusive territories, which the bottlers must develop fully. One
method by which this is accomplished involves distribution of Coke through vending machines at
various locations. After sampling the product from one of these conveniently located machines,
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The Court in Sylvania specifically recognized the importance of the dealerservices concept and the need to protect those dealers who provide services
from the adverse impact of free riders. 120 In addition, Justice White in his
concurrence acknowledged the shift from the restraints on alienation concept
to "the notions of 'free rider' effects and distributional efficiencies borrowed by
the majority from the 'new economics of vertical relationships."" '12
Ironically, a dealer-services rationale was offered in Albrecht as a partial
basis to justify imposition of a per se rule. The majority held that the
maximum price might not allow dealers to provide essential services to
consumers if the price were too low.' 22 The flaw in this argument is that no
market supplier would set a price ceiling so low as to preclude services
essential for the sale of its product.' 23 As such, inability to provide services
should not be used to support imposition of a per se rule. Normally, a
dealer-cartel rationale is applied to justify a per se rule in price restriction
cases, while the dealer-services theory supports a rule of reason approach.
At this juncture, Professor Bork's forceful argument that restrictions should
be allowed even absent a danger of free riding 2 4 is noteworthy. His argument, which is based on a dealer-services theory, primarily addresses arrangements in which a consumer cannot obtain services from one dealer and
purchase the product from another because the services are an integral part of
the total product, as in the national gas station chain hypothetical described
above.' -5 Without the ability to ensure that the services are performed, the
marketer's national image may be damaged. Bork's position goes beyond the
Court's dictum in White Motors regarding justification of vertical restrictions
and probably even exceeds the Court's view in Sylvania.' 26 However, the
consumers presumably will be inclined to purchase the product from supermarkets for home
consumption. Thus, the company uses the machines as a sampling vehicle and as a means of
maintaining top-of-mind awareness of its product. However, because the volume for each
machine is so low and the costs of servicing so high, the dealer actually loses money selling the
product in this manner. The investment is, nevertheless, recouped and profits are realized
through increased grocery store sales, and, therefore, the grocery store price includes the costs of
the vending machine program. A free rider who does not provide vending machine service could
reduce his grocery store price and undercut the dealer who does offer such service. No dealer
could afford to risk this type of free-rider problem. Therefore, Coca Cola would find it impossible
to implement essential parts of its marketing programs which require dealer investment. Coca
Cola Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,010 (FTC initial decision,
Oct. 8, 1975), discussed in Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 6.
120. 433 U.S. at 54-55.
121. Id. at 69 (White, J., concurring).
122. 390 U.S. at 152-53. The Court also noted that the maximum price could become the
minimum price and that maximum resale price maintenance raised the possibility that distribution could be channelled through large or advantaged dealers who might otherwise have to
contend with nonprice competition. Id. at 153.
123. R. Posner, supra note 25, at 158.
124. Bork II, supra note 110, at 454-56.
125. See notes 111-17 supra and accompanying text.
126. In addition to a situation in which free-rider incursion is present, the Court has
indicated that vertical restrictions upon distribution may be justifiable in certain situations, as
when small firms are fighting to stay in business or when firms are faced with aggressive
competition. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. at 263. It would be illogical, however,
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proposition that dealer services must be protected if essential to competition,
even absent a free-rider problem, may yet be valid, for the Supreme Court
has never expressly rejected this position.
C.

Summary

The reason for examining these two theories is to recognize that the mere
existence of a restriction on distribution does not automatically imply that the
restricting firms intend to exclude competition for the purpose of charging
inflated prices. The dealer-services theory shows that restrictions can be
used as a tool to increase interbrand competition. "127 On the other hand, if the
dealer-cartel theory appropriately explains the behavior of the parties, an
intent to reap monopoly profits may be inferred. As Justice Harlan explained
in Albrecht, absent behavior which qualifies as a cartel among dealers, a per
se rule is inappropriate. Therefore, it is imperative that restrictions be
examined for their impact on competition,

12

8

and, as these two theories

demonstrate, the form of the restriction cannot conclusively determine this
impact.
III.

The Proposed Test for Reasonableness

A. Scope and Applicability
At the present time, a rule of reason analysis can be applied only to
nonprice vertical restrictions. Currently, no argument of reasonableness will
save an arrangement in which the court has determined the existence of a
horizontal conspiracy.' 29 Moreover, if a court finds a territorial restraint to be
ancillary to a price-fixing scheme, it will normally rule the territorial restraint
per se unlawful as well. 130 Therefore, because the test proposed below can
apply at present only to vertically imposed territorial restraints not tied to
price-fixing, this discussion is limited to such restraints. Extension of the rule
of reason analysis to other classes of restraints on distribution is discussed in
Part V.
The Sylvania majority referred to the rule of reason test as the "prevailing
standard of analysis." 1 3 ' Before this decision, however, application of the per
to conclude that these situations are the only ones in which the Court will allow distribution
restrictions, for to do so would shift determination of legality away from demonstrable economic
effects and back to a formalistic distinction.
127. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 54-55. "Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic product . . . and Is the
primary concern of antitrust law. . . . In contrast, intrabrand competition Is the competition
between the distributors-wholesale or retail-of the product of a particular manufacturer." Id.
at 52 n.19.
128. Id. at 58-59; see id. at 52 n.19.
129. "[Tjhe market supplier must avoid a finding or inference of horizontal or conspiratorial
activity or purpose . . . . It should be noted that since the method of enforcing the vertical
restriction may be determinative of whether horizontal activity is present, the market supplier
must avoid any inference of joint effort with his distnbutors and retailers when enforcement Is
necessary." Averill, supra note 34, at 61.
130. Id. at 60-61.
131. 433 U.S. at 49.

1979]

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS

se rule was expanding, while use of the rule of reason was becoming more
limited. 132 Thus, Professor Posner rightly disputes the Court's pronouncement
that a rule of reason analysis prevailed. 1 33 Prior to Schwinn, if restrictions on
distribution were not deemed per se unlawful, they were made subject to a
34
rule of reason analysis which generally meant that they were per se lawful .
As such, no single, structured approach has evolved to aid courts in determining whether practices are unreasonable. Therefore, the standard to be applied
in determining the reasonableness of vertical territorial restraints will be, by
and large, a new one, developed subsequent to Sylvania, under which
3
findings of unreasonableness, as well as reasonableness, should be possible.. S
B.

Basisfor the Proposed Rule of Reason Test
Application of a rule of reason approach is based upon the conviction that
certain "practices may be justified if reasonable and ancillary to a legitimate
business purpose, and if more beneficial to interbrand competition than
detrimental to intrabrand competition."' 136 The starting point for development
of a test, according to the Sylvania Court, 1 37 would be the rule enunciated by
Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States: 38
To determine [reasonableness] the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
39
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.1

This formulation, in effect, directs attention solely to the history of the
restraint in question to determine its competitive purpose and impact. Therefore, as Professor Posner astutely points out, Justice Brandeis' formulation
does not provide usable criteria for the determination of illegality because the
Brandeis inquiries are general and do not provide the structure of a test that
would balance the harm to intrabrand competition against the benefit to
interbrand competition. 4 0 What the formulation does provide is the proper
132. L. Sullivan, supra note 15, § 59, at 153.
133. "The Rule of Reason is rarely used to decide cases. Agreements among competitors are
ordinarily condemned outiight under the per se rule forbidding price fixing or its equivalents.
Mergers are governed by reasonably specific rules evolved in decisions construing section 7 of the
Clayton Act. Vertical restrictions other than mergers are governed by per se rules (for example,
tie-ins), by rules developed in decisions interpreting section 3 of the Clayton Act (requirements
contracts, for instance), or by rules developed in monopolization cases under section 2 of the
Sherman AcL" Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 14.
134. "The ... Rule of Reason . . . is little more than a euphemism for nonliability." Id.
135. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pt. 1), 74 Yale L.J. 775, 781 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bork I].
136. Broader Rule of Reason, supra note 49, at 126 (footnote omitted). Interbrand competition is the "primary concern" of antitrust law. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. at 52 n.19.
137. 433 U.S. at 49 n.15.
138. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
139. Id. at 238.
140. Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 15; see Bork I, supra note 135, at 840.
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focus for a rule of reason analysis-whether competition is merely regulated
or promoted or whether it is suppressed or destroyed.
The Sylvania Court also directs attention to White Motor Co. v. United
States,'14 which stands for the proposition that courts should inquire into "the
actual impact . . . on competition. ' 1 4 2 The White Motor Court's reason for
requiring this inquiry, however, was to determine whether vertical restraints
should be subject to a rule of reason or per se analysis, and not to determine
whether a specific restraint was reasonable in a given context. Any doubt as
to application of the impact-on-competition concept as a basis for determining
reasonableness, however, is dispelled by National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States,143 in which the Court said: "[The inquiry [of
reaonableness]
is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive condi14
' 4
tions.
Posner argues, however, that competition should not be the only measure of
whether a restraint is reasonable and that an additional inquiry should be
whether efficiency is increased.1 45 Otherwise, claims Posner, restraints that
reduce competition but increase efficiency would be prohibited. A case in
point would be a merger which, though resulting in a monopoly, enhances
efficiencies such that prices drop below the levels reached in the previously
competitive market. 146 The problem with this view that what benefits business benefits society is that it requires reliance on businessmen with complete
market power to preserve society's interests. Yet, without147competition there
are no incentives for businessmen to hold prices down.
Posner would structure a rule of reason approach based on the premise that
a market supplier acting in his own interest is, in effect, serving the public
interest. Specifically, he would inquire "whether the restriction is intended to
cartelize distribution or, on the contrary, to promote the manufacturer's own
interests.' 48 Despite philosophical differences between Posner's approach and
141.

372 U.S. 253 (1963).

142. Id. at 263 (footnotes omitted), cited in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. at 50.
143.

435 U.S. 679 (1978).

144. Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
145. Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 15. Posner also refers to Bork's view, see Bork
I, supra note 135, at 830-38, that only practices which are economically inefficient should be
condemned. Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 16.
146. Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 15.
147. In other words, while a company is amassing monopoly power, consumers benefit from
the economies realized from the firm's efficiency. However, once interbrand competition is
effectively eliminated, what forces will keep prices down? Certainly prices will not rise too high
because at some point the increased profits will not compensate for the drop in demand.
Nevertheless, there will be no external force to keep prices reasonable.
148. Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 17. Posner suggests a three part inquiry: "1.
Does the restriction embrace so large a fraction of the market as to make cartelization a plausible
motivation for the restriction? If not, the restriction should be held lawful. 2. If [yes], do dealers
in the product in question provide any presale services? If not, the restriction should be deemed
unlawful . . . . 3. If the answer to both . . . questions is yes, . . . did the manufacturer's output
increase or decrease after imposing the restriction? If his output increased, the burden would shift
to the government of showing that it increased for reasons unrelated to the restriction. If output
fell after imposition of the restriction, the restriction would be deemed unlawful, unless . . .
defendant could prove that he intended . . . to increase his output." Id. at 19.
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the one proposed below,1 4 9 his formulation is helpful in developing an
analysis that is in accord with precedent and will make application of the rule
of reason operational, for the criteria he posits are useful barometers of
competitiveness.
C.

The Test

The analysis proposed here is comprised of four parts: a determination of
the restricting firms' market power; an inquiry as to the freedom of access to
competitive goods; an examination of the economic justification of the restriction and its positive and negative effects on competition; and an evaluation of
the excessiveness of the restraint.
1. Market Power
Because impact on competition is the central inquiry on which the analysis
will be based, the relevant market must be defined, and the market power of
the restricting firms, that is, their ability to affect competition within that
market, must be shown. 5 0 Determination of the relevant market requires
definition of both the geographic s and the product markets in which the
restricting firms compete. The product market may range from a number of
totally fungible or interchangeable goods to a unique product or brand
forming a specialized market. 5 2 Actual power within the relevant market
should be shown in the traditional way by determining percentages of sales in
both dollars and units. The parties, however, also should I be
able to introduce
S3
additional evidence as to the degree of market power.
Substantial power of firms' 5 4 within a market could be indicative, though
not probative, of an intent to obtain monopoly profits.'" Conversely, the
overall weakness of the restricting firms in the relevant market could indicate
149. The major difference is that Posner would condemn only those firms that have reached
monopoly proportions and are shortsighted enough to let prices reduce output. Re(flections on
Sylvania, supra note 81, at 17.
150. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 64 (White, J.. concurring,
American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248 (3d Cir. 197s)151. Geographic market is defined as the area in which the parties effectively compete. The
area is not ordinarily definable with absolute precision. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co., 365 U.S. 320, 331-32 (1961).
152. A product market includes those products which consumers would purchase as reasonable substitutes for the product in question. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U S, 563, 571
(1966); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
153. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 64 (White, J., concurring).
Justice White notes that the traditional measures of market power are market share as well as
product differentiation. The latter is referred to above as uniqueness of brand or product, See
note 152 supra and accompanying text. Justice White cites both F. Scherer, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance 10-11 (1970) and P. Samuelson, Economics 485-91 (10th
ed. 1976), for elaboration. 433 U.S. at 64 n.4 (White, J., concurring). It should be noted that if
monopoly power or a tendency to monopolize exists, other parts of the antitrust laws might be
invoked. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
154. Usually the supplier's market power will be in issue; however, it may also be necessary
to assess the dealers' power within their relevant market to use suppliers as tools for implementing dealer cartels.
155. See R. Posner, supra note 25, at 165-66; Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 19.
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that restraints are imposed to improve competitive ability. In Sylvania, for
example, a national television manufacturer's market share amounted to an
insignificant one to two percent of national sales. If the dominant firm
controlled sixty to seventy percent of a market comprised of one hundred
manufacturers, 15 6 a weak firm may have a need to improve its competitive
position by imposing restrictions on distribution.
Professor Posner would excuse from further antitrust scrutiny those firms
which are too weak to collude effectively. 157 Posner goes on to assert that
unless the manufacturer has a large market share, or unless all or most
manufacturers have uniform restrictions, the dealer would not enjoy any
monopoly power in the market place. The first problem with this reasoning is
that Posner might never reach an inquiry into the existence of similar
restraints imposed by other manufacturers because restricting firms with small
market shares would be excused from further scrutiny. 15 8
The second problem is that Posner would find cartelization violative only
when interbrand competition is not a significant factor in the market, that is,
when the restricting firms' market share i; very large. His test, therefore,
excuses firms that can cartelize at the intrabrand level in a highly competitive
interbrand market. Although such a result would seem consonant with the
Court's direction in Sylvania, it does not take into account such things as a
unique brand, in itself a manifestation of market power. Because of brand
differences perceived by consumers, lack of intrabrand competition, even
when interbrand competition is substantial, could be a significant advantage
to a dealer, particularly if another manifestation of market power, such as
quality image, exists. Quality image, for example, may give the dealer all the
help he needs in generating sales. Therefore, he has no need for protection of
his position through limited intrabrand competition. Thus, to determine
whether a particular firm falls into the category of those able to cartelize at
the intrabrand level in a highly competitive interbrand market, it is necessary
to evaluate the impact of all restrictions on interbrand and intrabrand
competition. Specifically, one must ascertain whether the restricting firm has
initiated the restraints in order to compete more effectively, or simply has
tried to reap monopoly profits, even without monopoly power. Firms with
little market power, therefore, should not be excluded from further inquiry.
2.

Freedom of Access to Competitive Goods

The second part of the test asks whether the practices in question inhibit
free access to existing competitive goods and thus result in untoward competitive effects. The examination of these practices should focus on both ends of
the marketing system. Assuming that products of a like quality and character
produced by other market suppliers exist, the primary question in all cases is
whether such products are available to dealers or distributors. 15 9 Similar
156.

See 433 U.S. at 38 & n.1.

157. Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 17; see note 148 supra.
158. See Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 17. The importance of determining
whether other manufacturers impose similar restraints is covered in part two of the proposed test
dealing with freedom of access to competitive goods. See notes 159-65 infra and accompanying
text.
159. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 3S8 U.S. 365, 381 (1967); BroaderRule of
Reason, supra note 49, at 126-27 & n.29.
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products may exist but may be unavailable if all competing market suppliers
have exclusive selling arrangements with their franchisees such that other
dealers do not have access to those market suppliers' goods. Alternatively, the
competing manufacturers could be vertically integrated and thus not need to
sell to independents. If competitive goods are not available, restrictions
imposed by the market supplier could impede competition by foreclosing access
to competitive goods. 160 On the other hand, the availability of many goods to
retailers and wholesalers could indicate a need on the part of the suppliers to
16
promote more aggressive competition in the retail market. 1
This inquiry should not be conclusive on the issue of competitiveness but
rather should be part of a balancing process. For example, in the case of a
new product's entry into the market, no similar product would be available,
but the supplier who holds a weak market position might have to insist on
restraints if successful marketing of the new product requires such treatment. 162 Thus, the availability of similar products must be weighed against,
among other things, the restricting firm's market position.
A second question to ask when other brands are available is whether the
dealer or the distributor, as part of his agreement with the market supplier, is
prevented from dealing in other suppliers' brands by exclusive dealing arrangements. 163 Whereas the prior inquiry looked to lack of competing goods
at the lower level of the market, this inquiry looks to whether the market
supplier is attempting to exclude other market suppliers from the territories. 164 An exclusive dealing relationship combined with substantial market power would probably evidence a plan to exclude other market suppliers
from the market and, therefore, would be an unreasonable restraint of trade.
A weak competitor, however, might require the full attention of the dealer to
compete adequately and may be able to induce this attention only by imposing
distribution restraints that afford the dealer protection against free riders.1 6 s
160. This part of the test does not pertain to monopoly situations, which are covered in part
one of the test. See notes 150-58 supra and accompanying text. Rather, this part deals with
situations in which the dealer's access to goods is cut off because of exclusive contracts between
other market suppliers and their dealers.
161. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); see notes 156 supra and 194-97 infra and
accompanying text.
162. The market supplier might have to rely on his distributor to develop the local market
and to convince consumers that they need a product that has never existed before. Most newly
developed small appliances fall into this category. Although national advertising can stimulate
consumer inquiry, it is the dealer who usually consummates the sale.
163. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967). Exclusive dealing
arrangements could also violate § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), "where the effect
. . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce." Id. (emphasis added).
164. A bill had been proposed in the 92d Congress that territorial restraints be permitted if
products "in free and open competition with products of like grade and quality produced by
persons other than the supplier" are available to the dealer and that dealer is not prohibited from
dealing in those products by his supplier. H.R. 370, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 180
(1971), discussed in Broader Rule of Reason, supra note 49, at 149 n.197.
165. Exclusive dealing arrangements also may be lawful in franchising arrangements that
are not accompanied by unlawful tying. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47-52 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
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Economic Justifications

The third part of the test requires defendants to justify their restrictive
practices. Here, the first inquiry is whether the restricting firm has an
economic need to prevent intrabrand competition. Specific questions to be
answered in this part of the analysis are: Were valuable services reflected in
the prices charged by dealers handling the product which could easily be
undercut by encroaching dealers not providing those services? 166 Or, is
interbrand competition so intensive that, even absent a need for costly sales
services, the market supplier must necessarily give dealers and distributors a
special incentive to promote that market supplier's product actively in order
to gain effective distribution in the market place? 167 In other words, is the
dealer given a premium for marketing advocacy? 168 Such an arrangement
might have occurred in Sylvania where the supplier had an insubstantial
share of the television market. Whether or not Sylvania's dealers were
required to offer sales services, the Sylvania
restrictions could have been
169
necessary to gain retail-market advocacy.
To determine whether the restraints were initiated to enhance competitive
capabilities, courts should also look for evidence of coercion on the part of
either market suppliers or distributors and dealers. The initiator of the
restraint would not be able to exercise coercion, however, without having
sufficient market power to enforce the restrictions. A showing of coercive
practices could be probative of the existence of a dealer cartel. 1 °
The success of the restraints, though not absolutely probative, is also part
of the inquiry into economic justifications and should be tested by evaluating
the practice's effect on output. If output has increased as a result of the
restraints, it could evidence increased interbrand competition. If output has
tended to decrease, it could well indicate that monopoly prices are being
charged at the retail level. 171 A decrease due to monopoly prices, however,
will occur only when the firms have substantial market power. Because the
dealers in such a situation are content with the increase in profits that exceeds
the revenue lost by the reduction in demand, decreased output could be
166. The restrictions could be imposed for the primary purpose of protecting the market
supplier from free riders who would hurt the quality name of the market supplier by not
providing essential services, even though they do not hurt those dealers who do provide such
services. Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, In:., 561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977).
167. Price restraints have been explained on the basis that manufacturers do not want their
products discounted because it impairs the quality image of the product among consumers. This
reasoning assumes a certain degree of irrational consumer behavior. Telser, supra note 85, at 86
n.1.

168. It is conceivable that the proponents of the dealer-services theory would include local
marketing advocacy as part of that theory, for the dealer must devote some selling time to gaining
consumer acceptance.
169. Courts have recognized that small or failing firms should be allowed more leniency than
powerful firms. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 64-65 (White, J.,
concurring); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
170. See Telser, supra note 85, at 88.
171. "The object of the dealers' cartel is to raise the price of the good above its previous
(competitive) level. If this goal is attained, the amount of the good demanded, and hence
supplied, will fall . . . ." Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 18.
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probative of a dealer cartel. It must be stressed, however, that an arrangement may be unlawful regardless of the effect of the restraints upon output.
4. Excessiveness of the Restraint
The final part of the test goes to the excessiveness of the restraint: "whether
the restriction 'exceed[s] the outer limits of restraint reasonably necessary to
protect the defendant."" 72 This inquiry, however, should not look for a less
73
restrictive alternative.

1

One problem with a "no less restrictive alternative standard" is that it
would unnecessarily overburden businessmen because they would have to
choose the least restrictive of all available alternatives rather than select a
restriction "reasonably calculated to achieve the desired result without unduly
hindering competition.1 174 Moreover, courts would have to substitute their
judgments for business decisions. Finally, hindsight almost invariably brings
a less restrictive alternative to light, and, therefore, restraints which seem
perfectly reasonable
and unexcessive at the time would be invalidated solely
1 7S
on this basis.

To avoid these problems, this part of the test should examine instead
whether the chosen means are reasonably suited to achieve a desired lawful
end-enhancement of interbrand competition. If businessmen have engaged
in restraints for the purpose of improving their ability to compete, they have
doubtless done so in response to perceived market pressures, and they should
be willing and able to explain how the chosen restraints enhance their ability
to compete without being excessive. The court essentially determines whether
the restraint goes too far, thereby indicating an intent to cartelize.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE TEST TO THE SYLVANIA AND SCHWIXVN FACT
PATTERNS

In evaluating the facts of the Sylvania and Schwinn cases under the
proposed rule of reason test, it should be noted that the reported decisions may
not contain all the pertinent information called for in such an analysis. The
purpose of this exercise is not to show how the actual cases should have been
resolved, but to illustrate the balancing process that courts should undertake in
evaluating the economic criteria and to suggest an outcome based only upon
the facts considered.
A.

Sylvania

Market power: The relevant market consisted of all television brands, some
100 in number, marketed in the entire United States. In 1962, when its new

marketing policy was implemented, Sylvania products accounted for one to
two percent of television sales.' 76 For the sake of this analysis, it is assumed
172. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Walt Disney Prods. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 113, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
173. See 44 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 436, 447-48 (1976).
174. Id. at 448 (footnote omitted).
175. Id.
176. 433 U.S. at 38 & n.1.
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that both dollar and unit sales were at the one to two percent level. The
opinion reveals no other manifestations of market power on the part of
Sylvania or its retailers as a group.
Freedom of access to competitive goods: Of the numerous brands of
televisions sold nationally, 177 it is likely that Sylvania's dealers could have
carried at least some of 79them. 178 Moreover, Sylvania engaged in no exclusive
dealing arrangements. 1

Economic justifications: The number of dealers handling Sylvania products
in a given area was limited, and dealers were allowed to sell only from
approved locations. In the face of aggressive interbrand competition, 180
Sylvania limited the number of franchises in order to increase sales and
market share by attracting aggressive and competent retailers. 181 Sylvania
apparently perceived a need to restrict intrabrand competition in order to
assure dealer loyalty, but there was no evidence of coercion. In fact, Sylvania
refused to bow to pressure from Continental, one of its San Francisco
distributors, to allow it to expand to another California market. The effect on
output was that sales increased, giving Sylvania a five percent market
share
182
nationally and making it the nation's eighth largest producer.
Excessiveness of restraints: Although Sylvania controlled the number of
dealers serving a particular area, it gave no exclusive territories, nor did it
impose customer restrictions. The location clauses that Sylvania imposed are
18 3
regarded as the least restrictive of the three major nonprice restraints.
Discussion: Initially, Sylvania was a weak competitor in the market, and
its position was declining. In essence, the firm was fighting for its existence.
Its withdrawal from the market, however, would have impaired interbrand
competition for the simple reason that one competitor would have disappeared. Given its weakness, Sylvania had a need to attract aggressive
retailers,' 8 4 which it accomplished by offering limited retail locations. 185 Also,
because of the fierce interbrand competition in the market, Sylvania needed to
ensure the loyalty of its franchisees. The procompetitive intent of the plan was
evidenced by the increased output and market share, by the absence of
coercion on the part of either the dealers or the market supplier, and by the
absence of exclusive dealing arrangements. Sylvania even seemed willing to
increase the level of intrabrand competition for its products by increasing the
177.

Id. at 38.

178. In fact, the decision indicates that Sylvania dealers could obtain other brands because
plaintiff-dealer Continental placed a huge order with Phillips in protest of Sylvania's having
granted a franchise to one of Continental's competitors at a nearby location. Id. at 38-39 & n.3.
179. Id. at 38 n.3.
180. The intensity of competition is evidenced by the fact that RCA had 60% to 70% of sales,
and over 100 other manufacturers were competing for the remainder. Id. at 38 n. 1.
181. Id. at 38-39.
182. Id.
183. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
184. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (firm's weakness may
justify vertical territorial restraints); notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
185. For the purpose of this analysis, it should be rioted that Sylvania made no claim that
valuable sales services were required, nor did Sylvania claim that the reason for the restrictions
was to protect dealers from free-rider incursion once the dealers made an investment in costly
services.
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number of dealers in an18 area
where it was not satisfied with the performance
6
of existing franchisees.
On balance, interbrand competition increased significantly, whereas prior
to the restraints, Sylvania was on the verge of becoming a nonentity in the
market. Because intrabrand competition could not have existed to a great
degree when sales were faltering, Sylvania's restrictions could not have
reduced it substantially.18 7 Thus, the increase in interbrand competition
outweighs the harm to intrabrand competition. Finally, by antitrust standards, the Sylvania restraints were very minor.1 8 8 Because the location
clauses did not totally eliminate intrabrand competition within a given
territory, it would seem that the purpose was to ensure dealer loyalty, and not
to allow dealers to reap monopoly profits. Thus, the restraints seem consonant
with the competitive pressures that Sylvania faced and reasonably calculated
to fulfill Sylvania's needs. In sum, then, the type of practice exemplified by
Sylvania should withstand a rule of reason analysis.
B.

Schwinn

Market power: The relevant market in Schwinn was comprised of all
bicycle brands sold in the United States by both foreign 189 and domestic
manufacturers using either private labels or brand names. In 1951, the year
before its new marketing policy was implemented, Schwinn was the nation's
largest bicycle marketer 19" and its bicycles accounted for 22.5% of all sales in
192
this market. 191 Schwinn was also known for the high quality of its bicycles.
The opinions revealed no other manifestations of market power, such as sole
source of supply or unique brand. In fact, in 1965, Schwinn bicycles sold for
less than they did in 1951,193 thereby reflecting Schwinn's unwillingness to
charge monopoly prices.
Freedom of access to competitive goods: Sources of bicycles for dealers were
not scarce. There were nine domestic manufacturers with eleven plants in
186. Sylvania franchised an additional dealer in San Francisco because Sylvania's share of
sales for that city was 2.5%, half the national average. Adding a new dealer located near an
existing one would increase the intrabrand competition potential. 433 U.S. at 39 & n.4.
187. Justice White noted that "there is less potential for restraint of intrabrand competition
[than in Schwinn]. Sylvania.. . did not restrict the customers to whom or the territories where its
purchasers could sell . . . . [It also] had an insignificant market share . . . and enjoyed no
I..."
Id. at 59 (White, J., concurring).
consumer preference .
188. The Supreme Court majority noted the Ninth Circuit's finding that the Sylvania
restrictions "had less potential for competitive harm than the [Schwinn] restrictions." Id. at 41.
Justice White agreed with the circuit court's analysis. Id. at 59-63 (White, J., concurring).
189. Foreign-made bicycles accounted for 29.7% of sales in 1961. United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 369.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 368. The opinion does not indicate whether sales were measured in terms of
dollars or units. For the sake of analysis, it is assumed that the market shares are reported in
units and that Schwinn would have had a higher share of dollar sales.
192. The district court noted that Schwinn "prides itself on being called the Cadillac of the
bicycle industry." United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 335 (N.D. 111.
1965).
193. Id.
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1962,194 and, according to the district court, there had been twelve manufacturers after World War 11.195 Foreign bicycles were also sold in substantial
numbers in the American market. 196 The lower court opinion indicates that
most retailers took advantage of the availability of many brands by carrying
several of them. 197 Schwinn, for its part, did not insist upon exclusive dealing
arrangements, thereby leaving dealers free to carry as many different brands
of bicycles as they chose.198
Economic justifications: Schwinn limited its dealers to bicycle repair shops,
thus excluding mass merchandisers and hardware stores. 199 The mass merchandisers wanted to market Schwinn products under their own private labels
at a price that would have forced Schwinn to cut back on quality and would
have undermined its plans to maintain its product's reputable name.
Hardware stores, as well as other mass merchandisers who operated largely
by mail order, were unable to provide presale and postsale services that were
essential to maintaining consumer satisfaction. 20 0 The bicycle repair shops
were limited to specified locations for the purpose of ensuring that dealers
adequately serviced their areas. The dealers carried sufficient inventories and
aggressively promoted Schwinn bicycles. 20 1 Although the dealers could sell
only to retail customers and not to unfranchised wholesalers, they could sell in
other franchisees' territories . 2 02 Presumably, this customer-class restraint protected Schwinn from retailers who would discount the bicycles without
offering requisite services and prevented the retailers themselves from being
hurt by free riders.
Wholesalers were given exclusive territories and their customer sales were
limited to franchised retailers within their territories. 20 3 The exclusive territories were provided to induce the wholesalers to promote the Schwinn line
aggressively.2 0 4 Customer sales to franchisees were limited exclusively to the
distributor's territory to assure Schwinn that sales were made only to
licensed
20 6
franchisees. 20 5 The district court found no evidente of coercion.
The effect of these restrictions was to increase output substantially, both in
terms of dollars and unit sales. 20 7 Schwinn's market share, however, declined
significantly to 12.8% by 1961,
dropping it to second place behind Murray,
20 8
which had a 22.8% share.
Excessiveness of restraints:The limited number of dealer locations encour194.

195.
196.
197.
198.
brands.
199.
200.
201.

388 U.S. at 369.

237 F. Supp. at 337.
388 U.S. at 369.
See 237 F. Supp. at 338.
Apparently, Schwinn did not object to its distributors' or dealers' marketing other
Id.
Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 336-38.
See 388 U.S. at 370; 237 F. Supp. at 338.

202.

237 F. Supp. at 332-33.

203.

388 U.S. at 371.

204.

237 F. Supp. at 339-40.

205.
206.
207,
208,

Id.
Id.
388
Id.

at 341.
at 338-39.
U.S. at 368.
at 368-69.
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aged dealers to promote Schwinn products aggressively and protected them
from free riders. However, the customer restriction which confined dealers to
retail sales appears to be excessive absent a showing that Schwinn had a
major problem with dealers supplying nonfranchisees. Franchisees had an
automatic incentive not to sell to unlicensed dealers because they would have
undercut their own sales. Furthermore, an unlicensed retailer who had to
buy from another retailer at other than the wholesale price would have had a
difficult time undercutting franchisees. Finally, if Schwinn had a problem
with a few franchisees selling to nonfranchisees, it could always terminate its
agreement with those franchisees.
With respect to distributors, granting exclusive territories would logically
encourage them to maximize sales to retailers. The restrictions compelling
distributors to sell only to franchised dealers ensured that Schwinn's plan to
maintain services at the dealer level would not be threatened and protected
the franchised dealers from free riders. On the other hand, it is difficult to see
how further restrictions of distributors' sales to customers in their own
territories did anything more to protect Schwinn from indiscriminate sales to
nonfranchisees. As such, 2the
restriction of sales solely to retailers within the
0 9
territory seems excessive.

Discussion: Schwinn seemingly had a strong market position as evidenced
by the fact that it was the market leader in 1951. Substantial changes were
taking place in the market, however, making it difficult for Schwinn to
maintain both its market share and the quality of its product. The number of
low cost private label brands was increasing, and Schwinn could not supply
private label mass merchandisers at a profit.2 10 Schwinn's overall decline in
market share, despite increased efficiencies that allowed it to reduce rather
than increase prices, 2 1 ' evidenced Schwinn's lack of market power. That sales
increased substantially as a result of the restrictions shows that Schwinn was
doing its best to be competitive in a highly competitive market.
Given the very active competition, much of which was low price competition, Schwinn's franchise plan was reasonably calculated to maintain its
quality image and to ensure that essential services were provided. Without
these services, consumers may not have wanted to purchase Schwinn bicycles,
and even those consumers who had bought the bicycles may have become
dissatisfied with the lack of services. 21 2 As the district court stated: "The
209. It does not appear from the district court decision that Schwinn argued that the purpose
of this restriction was to alleviate a substantial free-rider problem among distributors who
otherwise might invade one another's territory. If this were the purpose, as might be inferred
from some of the background material, the restraint may have been justifiable. See 237 F. Supp.
at 339-41.
210. Id. at 336. The reason for this is that Schwinn refused to sacrifice quality for the lower
costs necessary to make a profit selling to mass merchandisers.
211. "By franchising the local cycle outlets and dealing with them only, Schwinn has
remained in business and is still furnishing the best grade bicycle at prices now below those of
1951 and still making a profit." Id. at 335.
212. "Adequate service and repair is an absolute essential for any bicycle manufacturing
company." If the services are not provided, the "customer is likely to look for a brand or make of
bicycle where he can be assured of service, repairs and replacements. He will also make a similar
recommendation to his friends." Id. at 338.
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evidence is abundar~ty clear that Schwinn's [franchise plan] has greatly
enhanced trade in Schwinn bicycles and has in fact been the salvation of

Schwinn .

. . . 213

The dealer location restraint and the distributor's exclusive territory restraint were both reasonable and necessary to protect the dealers and distributors from free riders and to assure that vital services were provided. The
distributor customer-class restraint was necessary for Schwinn to police its
program of selling only through bicycle repair shops. If Schwinn were
enjoined from imposing this type of restraint, other market suppliers, who
could afford to handle distribution without outside dealers, would have had
an unfair advantage over market suppliers like Schwinn who could not afford
this alternative. Furthermore, a prohibition against customer-class restraints
encourages vertical mergers and could eliminate many independent distributors. The dealer customer-class restraint and distributor in-territory
customer restraint, on the other hand, seem excessive with respect to the
competitive conditions that brought about their initiation. In sum, most of the
Schwinn restrictions would be permissible under a rule of reason approach.
Rather than disallowing the entire program because two parts of it were
excessive, those parts should be severed from the rest and eliminated.
V.

EXTENSION OF THE RULE OF REASON TO OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON
DISTRIBUTION

A.

Horizontally Imposed Restrictions on Distribution

1. Justification of the Rule of Reason Application
In overruling Schwinn, the Sylvania Court acknowledged that vertical
restrictions on distribution are widely used in a free market economy 21 4 and
cited substantial authority to support their economic utility. 215 In dictum,
however, the Court, without elaborating upon its rationale, deemed such
restraints to be per se unlawful when horizontally imposed. 216 This per se rule
for horizontal restrictions developed because courts discovered that, with rare
exception, the purpose of the parties was to lessen competition at the market
level of those initiating the restraint. 2 17 These restraints are said to stifle
competition by depriving competitors of required goods or by eliminating
competition among the participants.2 18 Because of the supposed rarity of
lawfully inspired horizontal restrictions and the need for judicial economy, a
per se rule is applied. 219 The problem in applying a per se rule to horizontal
restrictions on distribution solely because of a generic distinction is that the
early cases on which the per se rule is based contained price fixing, group
213.
214.

Id.
433 U.S. at 57.

215.

Id.

at 54-58.

216. "There may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal
restrictions originating in agreements among the retailers. There is no doubt that restrictions In
the latter category would be illegal per se . . . ." Id. at 58 n.28 (citations omitted).
217. See Restricted Distribution, supra note 59, at 1040; note 62 supra and accompanying
text.
218. Restricted Distribution, supra note 59, at 1040.
219.

Id.

at 1040-41.
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boycotts, and concerted refusals to deal as dominant themes.2 2 0 Not until
United States v. Topco Associates 221 did the Court decide a case that involved
horizontally imposed territorial restraints alone, that is, without the presence
of price fixing or boycotts. 2 2 The Court apparently did not so view the case,
however, because it refused to differentiate Topco from the prior cases
2 23
containing more severe restraints.
Topco was a nonprofit buying and trademark-holding cooperative, which
distributed high quality private label food and nonfood items to its memberlicensees-twenty-five independent firms, most of which were regional grocery chains. 2 24 As to the territorial restraints imposed, the district court found
that the harm to intrabrand competition was outweighed by the benefit to
interbrand competition. 22s The Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded on the ground that the restrictions were horizontally imposed and,
226
therefore, per se violations of the antitrust laws.
2 27
The timing of Topco was unfortunate in that it followed Schwinn.
Therefore, even if the Topco restraints had been vertically imposed, they
would have been illegal per se under the doctrine of prohibition against
restraints on alienation adopted by the Schwinn Court. The Topco Court had
no problem extending the horizontal restraint per se rule to territorial limitations alone because horizontal restraints historically have been scrutinized
more closely and dealt with more severely than vertical restraints. 2 8 The
Court, therefore, was compelled by the history of section 1 of the Sherman
Act to deal harshly with Topco.
The anomaly of Topco is that the Government brought the action under the
per se rule, though it admitted to the district court that the arrangement had a
beneficial interbrand competitive effect. 229 The Government further acknowledged that, were Topco a vertically integrated national chain, it would not
have violated the antitrust laws.2 30 Once the Supreme Court decided that the
Topco restraints were horizontal and therefore per se illegal, however, it
characterized these claims
of reasonableness and procompetitiveness as "ir231
relevant to the issue.1

It is difficult, however, to understand how a commercial practice that
220. Broader Rule of Reason, supra note 49, at 136-37; 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 457, 465
(1971). For example, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967), Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 596, 598 (1951), and Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211, 240 (1899), all involved market divisions coupled with price fixing.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-47 (1966), Klor's, Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959), and Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941), all involved group boycotts.
221. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
222. BroaderRule of Reason, supra note 49, at 142; 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 457, 460 (1971).
223. 405 U.S. at 608.
224. United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1032-33 (N.D. IMI. 1970).
225. Id. at 1043.
226. 405 U.S. at 608.
227. Topco was decided in 1972, approximately five years after Schwinn.
228. See Restricted Distribution, supra note 59, at 1040-41.
229. 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
230. Id.
231. 405 U.S. at 609.
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enhances competition can at the same time have a "pernicious effect on
competition and lack . . . any redeeming virtue. '232 Just as the Court in
White Motor233 refused to extend the per se rule to vertical territorial
restraints unless the Northern Pacific test was met, 234 the Topco Court should
have accorded the same consideration to the Topco restraints because they,
too, differed from those found in prior cases. Instead, the majority in Topco
considered only the form of the restraint in rendering its per se ruling. In
refusing to consider the competitive impact of the Topco restraints, the
majority stated: "(C]ourts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic
problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of
competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition 2in
35
another sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules."
Five years later, however, the Sylvania majority criticized the Schwinn
Court for not distinguishing between "potential for intrabrand harm [and)
interbrand benefit. '236 Presumably, if such a balancing approach can be
undertaken with respect to vertically imposed restraints, it could likewise be
done in horizontal situations. 237 Fortunately, however, the Topco Court
seemingly stepped back from its absolute condemnation of horizontal restricper curiam the district court's grant on
tions on distribution by affirming
238
remand of modified restraints.

These modified restraints allowed Topco to use primary responsibility and
pass-over clauses to ensure proper development of retail markets. Primary
232. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). "Perse rules of illegality are
appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive." Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49-50.
233. 372 U.S. at 263.
234. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
235. 405 U.S. at 609-10 (footnote omitted).
236. 433 U.S. at 52.
237. One possible reason why courts have avoided finding arrangements to be horizontal
or have ruled that restrictions are primarily vertical even when they have horizontal elements
is that these courts find the per se prohibition on horizontal restrictions to be too harsh. For
example, the district court opinion in Topco, in a departure from precedent, considered the
territorial restrictions without distinguishing between horizontal and vertical restraints, Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was quick to point out this omission: "The District Court failed to
make any determination as to whether there were per se horizontal territorial restraints . . . and
simply applied a rule of reason . . . ." 405 U.S. at 608.
In White Motor, however, the Supreme.Court avoided finding a horizontal relationship when
the market supplier restrained its dealers from selling to certain classes of customers, retaining
those customers for itself. 372 U.S. at 258. This meant that the market supplier and the dealers
were operating at the same level and allocating customers among themselves. The Court
nevertheless treated the arrangement as a vertical restriction on distribution. Id. at 261. Similarly,
the FTC refused to find horizontal customer allocation between the Coca Cola Company and its
bottlers unreasonable even though the company also operated bottling facilities. Coca Cola Co.,
[1973-1976 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) '921,010 (FTC initial decision, Oct. 8,
1975). Another court refused to find Johnson & Johnson to be in competition with its dealers even
though it sold directly to one large ultimate customer. Johnson & Johnson v. Avenue Merchandise
Corp., 193 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). For a discussion of these cases, see 44 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 436, 450 (1976).
74,485 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per
238. United States v. Topco Assocs., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CC)
curiam, 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
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responsibility clauses define geographic areas for each dealer to develop and
allow for the termination of any dealer whose efforts in that regard are
inadequate. Profit pass-over clauses require a dealer who encroaches on
another's territory to share the portion of his profits that covers the costs of
services necessary to develop the territory. 23 9 Such clauses make it unprofitable to some degree for dealers to cross territorial lines. By granting this
remedy, the district court, in effect, indirectly allowed what the Supreme
stemmed from its desire
Court would not. The district court's ruling probably
24 0
to avoid eliminating Topco as a going concern.
The problem with the remedy granted, however, is that profit pass-over
clauses may not provide dealers with enough protection. Rather than merely
recouping some of his expenses, a dealer who develops a territory wants to
reap the full benefits of his investment in the form of profits. Furthermore, pass-over clauses cause administrative problems because many sales
will be hard to trace. Notwithstanding the modified nature of the new
restraints, it is difficult to understand why the court-approved restrictions
were not illegal themselves in light of the horizontal aspects of the arrangement. 241 These problems could be avoided by applying a rule of reason to
such restrictions. It should be "axiomatic that any test of legality [under
section 1 of the Sherman Act] for a territorial or customer restriction should be
responsive to the restriction's actual effects upon competition." 242 The Sylvania Court recognized this in striking down the Schwinn sales-agency
distinction.

243

Posner argues forcefully that plaintiffs should be required to prove that a
dealer cartel in fact exists2 4 4 because determination of legality based on a
vertical-horizontal distinction does not go to the objective of the challenged
restriction.2 4 5 Identification of the source of the restriction as the basis of
in
liability does not recognize dealers' "legitimate, nonmonopolistic interest
2 46
It
seeking to overcome through joint action serious free-rider problems.1
247
se
rule
is
reason
that
the
per
Another
also places form over substance.
inappropriate as a blanket condemnation of horizontal distribution restrictions
is that it effectively favors larger firms. Imposition of a per se rule prohibits
239.

Id.

240.

In his dissent to the original Supreme Court decision, Chief Justice Burger predicted that

absent congressional action, private label grocery items would be available only to large national
chains. 405 U.S. at 624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
241. In this regard the district court determined that the per se prohibition was invoked by
reason of the exclusivity of territories offered by Topco to its members. 1973-1 Trade Cas. at
94,154. The court overlooked, however, the invalidation of Topco's coextensive and nonexclusive

territories.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Broader Rule of Reason, supra note 49, at 142.
433 U.S. at 57.
R_ Posner, supra note 25, at 165.
Id. at 165-66; Broader Rule of Reason, supra note 49, at 144-4S.
R_ Posner, supra note 25, at 165.

247. Posner maintains that in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), discussed at
notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text, the member-licensees did not divide territories for the
purpose of obtaining monopoly prices. They did so to protect their members' investments in
developing territories from incursion by other member-licensees taking a free ride. R. Posner,
supra note 25, at 165-66; Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 9-10.
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arrangements such as the one in Topco, which enhance interbrand competition,2 48 benefit consumers, 249 enable small businessmen to compete with large
chains, 25 0 and provide markets for small manufacturers that they ordinarily
would not have.25 I Large firms that can afford to integrate vertically,
however, may achieve these goals without violating section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 252
Itt is suggested here that these failings of the per se rule as applied to
horizontal restraints can be avoided by using a rule of reason analysis. In this
way, courts will inquire into substance rather than form-a stated goal of the
-and can effectively determine the
Court in United States v. Sealy, Inc. 225354
competitive impact of these restraints.
2.

Application of the Rule of Reason Analysis to Topco

Market Power: The market was comprised of all grocery store products sold
in 33 states. 255 The market shares of the various Topco members ranged from
1.4% to 16.3% of dollar sales; 5.87% was the average. 2 S 6 Topco members'
combined retail sales in 1967 placed them fourth in terms of sales behind A & P,
Safeway, and Kroger. 257 There were no other manifestations of market
power.
Freedom of access to competitive goods: Private label products of the quality
and character of the Topco brands were available to large chains. 258 Unless
they belonged to buying cooperatives, smaller chains and independents had to
settle for products of a like character but less consistent quality. 259 Nationally
248. 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
249. Healthy interbrand competition usually keeps prices down and thereby benefits consumers. Id. at 1035.
250. See notes 258-63 infra and accompanying text.
251. "Smaller manufacturers, the most common source of private label products . . . benefit
from private label use by the assurance of a substantial market for their products .... " 319 F.
Supp. at 1035.
252. The Government conceded that an integrated national chain could legally do what
Topco could not. Id. at 1040.
253. 388 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1967).
254. It is quite possible that under the proposed rule of reason analysis, the Sealy restraints
would be found excessive because territories were allocated and resale prices were set. Such an
arrangement would have the potential to eliminate all intrabrand competition without a need to
do so. It is difficult to predict the outcome, however, merely by isolating a few of the facts out of
context.
255. 319 F. Supp. at 1039. Definition of market is not intended to be an issue in this analysis.
The district court's statement of facts relevant to defining the market is accepted here.
256. Id. at 1033. Defining market share in terms of units would not be meaningful given the
vast quantity of different products sold at differing unit costs.
257. In 1967, combined sales exceeded $2.3 billion. Individual vendors' sales volumes ranged
from $1.6 million to $182.8 million, and 18 of the 26 members had annual sales of less than $100
million. Id. Volume of individual members' sales is significant in that once a member grew to a
point where it could afford a private-label program of its own-usually when sales volume was
$250 million or more-it withdrew from Topco. Id. at 1039.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 1036.
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advertised brands were available to all competitors, and Topco members were
not prevented from acquiring and selling other brands, whether nationally
advertised or private-labelled. Topco also obtained
other private labels and
2 60
unbranded products for its member-licensees.
Economic justifications: Topco members were granted exclusive territories,
nonexclusive territories, and coextensive territories.2 61 There was considerable competition from large national and regional chains having the benefit of
private label programs. 262 Consequently, Topco members had a need for
similar programs. 263 Each Topco member was responsible for developing its
own territory by providing local services. 26 In these circumstances, Topco
members needed to protect the goodwill they had generated for the Topco
brand from free riders. 265 Topco exercised no coercion upon its members, yet
output 66 increased substantially. In 1940, the cooperative was very26modest,
7
but by 1967, members' combined sales amounted to $2.3 billion.
Excessiveness: Granting exclusive territories to dealers who spend their
own capital to develop the local market for given products seems reasonably
calculated to allow those dealers to reap the reward of their investment. 268 In
this regard it was necessary for members to have control over the admission of
new members.2 69 But Topco also granted exclusive marketing rights to
members in territories in which they did not compete, 270 and such a practice
is unnecessarily exclusive.
Discussion: The Topco arrangement, for the most part, would stand rule of
reason muster. Association members were very often a strong force in the
market but did not dominate it.2 7 Each member engaged in active competi260. Id. at 1032.
261. Id. at 1036.
262. Id. at 1034-36.
263. The grocery industry was becoming increasingly competitive; markets were saturated
with outlets, profit margins were slim, and large chains were succeeding in eliminating the
independents. Id. at 1034.
264. Id. at 1042.
265. "Many of the Topco members would not have joined Topco and many prospective
members will not join Topco without the assurance of exclusive use of the Topco private labels in
their primary marketing areas." Id. at 1036.
266. Lack of coercion is evidenced by the fact that Topco did not interfere in the management
of its members' local operations or buying activities. Id. at 1032.
267. 405 U.S. at 599-600.
268. See 319 F. Supp. at 1042.
269. An applicant for membership had to obtain approval by the board of directors and the
affirmative vote of 75% of the members to become a licensee. If, however, a member within 100
miles of the applicant voted to disaffirm, then an 85% affirmative vote of the members was
required. 405 U.S. at 602.
270. 319 F. Supp. at 1037.
271. The Supreme Court noted Topco members' strong competitive positions in their individual markets but made no claim that any of the members were dominant. 405 U.S. at 600. Lack
of adequate statistics for each competitor makes precise evaluation of the market position
difficult. It is very likely, however, that Topco members generally did not dominate their
respective markets insofar as competition within markets was intense. See note 263 supra.
Furthermore, when Topco members reached substantial sales volumes, they generally withdrew
from the cooperative and established their own private-label programs. See note 257 supra.
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tion with one or more of the large national or regional chains as well as with
many small chains and independents. 7 2 In fact, interbrand competition was
intense with the major force being the large chains. These major competitors
had access to comparable quality private labels that enabled them to compete
effectively. 273 The success of these major competitors contributed to the
disappearance of smaller competitors. 274 In the face of this competition,
Topco members' increases in output subsequent to the association's incorporation 275 evidenced their increased ability to compete at a time when other
smaller competitors were being eliminated.
In light of the interbrand competition and the substantial investment
required of the members to develop their own territories, grants of exclusive
territories were essential to protect those investments and to enhance competitive abilities. 276 Had Topco members used this exclusivity as a license to
charge monopoly prices, they would have lost their competitive parity with
national chains by effectively forcing consumers to select the nationally
277
advertised brands sold in member stores instead of the Topco brands.
Thus, because the low prices of private labels act as an inducement to
consumers, price gouging would have defeated the purpose of such a program.
Reserving territories for future expansion, therefore, was the only excessive
practice. These restraints should have been severed from the arrangement and
struck down. The entire arrangement, however, should not have fallen as a
result of this one excessive practice because the Topco restrictions were not
part of an aggregation of trade restraints. 278 Nor were they an integral part of
"a broad anticompetitive plan." 279 The fundamental purpose of the restrictions was to improve Topco members' ability to compete on the interbrand
level, 280 and the major portion of the Topco arrangement was designed to
achieve this goal. It would be imprudent to overrule the entire plan when only
a minor part of it was excessive.

272. 319 F. Supp. at 1033.
273. Id. at 1039-40.
274. See note 263 supra.
275. See note 267 supra and accompanying text.
276. See 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
277. Use of private labels allowed the stores to compete among themselves on the basis of
price. Stores could attract customers by discounting private labels or by using profits from
high-margin private labels to offset discounts on national brands. 405 U.S. at 599 n.3. If
members failed to use Topco brands in one of these ways, they would have lost customers to their
competitors who did.
278. See notes 220-23 supra and accompanying text.
279. Broader Rule of Reason, supra note 49, at 147.
280. "[E]xclusivity is the essence of a private label program . . . .Each national and large
regional chain . . . relies upon the exclusivity of its own private label line to differentiate [itself
from] competitors and to attract and retain the repeat business and loyalty of consumers. Smaller
retail grocery stores and chains are unable to compete effectively with the national . . . chains
without also offering their own exclusive private label products." 405 U.S. at 604-05 (quoting
Topco's answer to the Government's complaint).

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS

19791

B. Resale Price Maintenance
1. Restrictiveness of the Restraint
It is arguable that allocation of exclusive territories, which the Supreme
Court has indicated can be reasonable,"8 t is in certain cases more restrictive
of competition than resale price maintenance. 28 2 When exclusive territories
are assigned, dealers need not engage in nonprice competition2 8 3 because
they, in effect, have monopolies in their respective territories. 28 However,
when dealers are not totally insulated from competition by such territorial
protections, but are subject to resale price maintenance programs instead, the
28S
dealers are compelled to compete among themselves on a nonprice level.
Thus, as eich dealer competes for more sales, nonprice intrabrand competition will increase. Presumably, the effect of this nonprice intrabrand competition will be to increase sales, the market supplier's output, and competition at
the interbrand level.
Resale price maintenance programs may also serve to promote interbrand
competition with regard to both services and price, for even though one
market supplier sets a retail price28 6 another may not follow or may set a
different price. Contrasted with this situation is that of a market supplier
allocating exclusive territories. The purpose for the territorial restriction may
be to encourage dealers to provide presale services so that interbrand competition increases and the market supplier becomes a more viable competitor in
the total marketplace. Within each territory, however, there is virtually no
intrabrand competition. 28 7 In other words, intrabrand competition is sacrificed altogether for the purpose of improving the market supplier's interbrand competition potential. As a result, resale price maintenance would seem
somewhat less 2restrictive
of overall competition than would grants of exclu8
sive territories.

Notwitlistanding the fact that resale price maintenance, when imposed to
ensure presale services, can be less restrictive of intrabrand competition than
territorial restrictions, courts regard all types of resale price maintenance as
per se unlawful. 28 9 As Justice Harlan explained in Albrecht, the rationale for
a per se prohibition is that dealers combine to force the market supplier-as in
281.

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 57-58.

282.
283.

Broader Rule of Reason, supra note 49, at 146.
R. Posner, supra note 25, at 159. If, however, these territories were allocated by market

suppliers desirous of stimulating sales services, the dealer would jeopardize his franchise by
failing to offer those services.
284. Naturally, in localities where consumers are highly mobile, exclusive territories do not
offer great potential for dealers to exploit consumers by charging monopoly prices. Id.
285. Bork II, supra note 110, at 454.
286. In essence, the market supplier relies upon his own judgment to set prices rather than on
that of the individual dealer. Bork II, supra note 110, at 455.
287. See notes 283-84 supra and accompanying text.
288. Location clauses would usually be less restrictive than resale price maintenance or
exclusive territories. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
289. See pt. I(A)(1), (B) supra. The exception to the per se rule against resale price
maintenance applies to restrictions imposed unilaterally as in Colgate. See notes 22, 2627 supra
and accompanying text.
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a dealer cartel-to impose resale prices. 290 The rationale that Harlan
articulated, however, ignores the fact that dealers would have to wield great
power in order to force market suppliers to set resale prices. 29 1 A market
supplier serves no self-interest by fixing resale prices at a high level for the
purpose of assuring dealers high profits; 292 this tactic would reduce output
without increasing the supplier's profits. 29?'
With respect to excessiveness, it is arguable that cases of resale price
maintenance should be viewed with stricter scrutiny than cases of territorialism. This might result from the conviction that nonprice compotition is
not as beneficial to the mass of consumers as price competition. Price
competition, however, is not eliminated on the interbrand level; it is only
restricted on the intrabrand level. Therefore, resale price maintenance should
not be deemed to be per se unlawful; if a beneficial effect on competition can
be shown, and if the initiator of the restraint can justify imposition of this
type of restraint, the spirit of the antitrust laws has not been violated.
2.

Rationale for Resale Price Maintenance

Absent coercion by the dealers, the most logical reason that a market
supplier would have for setting resale prices is to induce interbrand competition among dealers in the mode of essential sales services. 294 The purpose of
such restraints, therefore,
is to increase the market supplier's interbrand
295
competition potential.
As discussed above, allocation of territories and/or customer restrictions can
be used by market suppliers to increase sales services. 296 Therefore, the
crucial question to ask with regard to resale price maintenance is why it
should be permitted when nonprice restraints can accomplish the same
business objectives. First, as shown above, resale price maintenance will
sometimes be less restrictive of interbrand competition than will territorial
restraints. 297 Second, price maintenance will be preferable in certain situations, such as those in which effective marketing requires thorough coverage
of a geographic area.298 Consider, for example, the position of a manufacturer
of small pocket calculators. Given the nature of the product, numerous outlets
covering the intended market are necessary in order for the manufacturer to
generate a substantial sales volume. Because territories would only be a few
blocks apart, a significant free rider problem could exist despite the imposition
of exclusive territorial restrictions. As such, certain dealers could offer services and yet lose sales to nearby dealers who discount prices and offer no
services. If wider territories were allocated, the market supplier could not
290. 390 U.S. at 157 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
291. Telser points out that this rationale is based on the assumption that there is "perfect
competition" among market suppliers and that dealers, "though powerless singly, collectively
have monopoly power." Telser, supra note 85, at 88.
292. See Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 4.
293. R. Posner, supra note 25, at 147-48.
294. See notes 104-09 supra and accompanying text.
295. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
296. See notes 104-10 supra and accompanying text.
297. See notes 281-88 supra and accompanying text.
298.

Bork II,supra note 110, at 454.
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hope to have an output sufficient to keep him in business. Resale price
maintenance is a practicable means available to such a market supplier for
encouraging its dealers to provide presale services and for protecting those
dealers from free riders. 299 As a result, the dealers in the area would be forced
to compete with one another on nonprice levels, and the market supplier
would be assured that essential services are provided.
Resale price maintenance may also be necessary when the product and the
services are intertwined, even if free riding is not a problem.3 00 In such
situations, consumers would not be expected to obtain desired services from
one dealer and buy the product from some other dealer. 30 1 Nonetheless,
because service is an essential component in marketing of the product, the
market supplier must be assured that the services are being offered, or he will
30 2
risk losing sales to competitors who do effectively offer the services.
3.

Applicability of the Rule of Reason Analysis

Because resale price restraints can be used to enhance interbrand competition, they should be analyzed under a rule of reason. "The fact that resale
price maintenance might sometimes be used to bolster a cartel does not
support the conclusion that it has a 'pernicious effect on competition,' which
implies something more than a mere possibility of abuse." 30 3 Despite the
Sylvania majority's claim to the contrary, 30 4 its analysis nevertheless supports
application of the rule of reason to resale price maintenance insofar as many
of the economic
justifications for nonprice restraints also apply to price
305
maintenance.
Given the potential of such restraints for increasing interbrand competition
while only reducing and not eliminating intrabrand competition, they do not
satisfy the "lack of any redeeming virtue" test of Northern Pacific. 30 6 Thus,
their illegality should not be conclusively presumed. Whether resale price
maintenance results from a dealer cartel can be tested under the rule of reason
analysis recommended above.
4.

Hypothetical Marketing Problem

A market supplier is often compelled to impose restrictions upon its dealers
to ensure that its product is properly marketed. Nonprice restraints, however,
299.

Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 9-10.

300.

Bork II, supra note 110, at 454.

301. For a discussion of a national gas station hypothetical, see notes 111-17 supr and
accompanying text. For a brief exposition of Professor Bork's position relative to products and
services, see notes 124-26 supra and accompanying text.
302. See Bork II, supra note 110, at 456 n.161.
303. Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 81, at 8.
304. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.

305.

Both Justice White, in his concurrence to the Supreme Court decision in Syk'ania, 433

U.S. 36, 63-71 (1977) (White, J.,concurring), and Judge Browning, in his dissent to the Ninth

Circuit decision, GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1019 (9th Cir.
1976) (Browning, J.,dissenting), acknowledged, with hesitation as to the far-reaching implica-

tions, that the economic analysis which justifies territorial restraints can likewise be used as a
justification for resale price maintenance.
306. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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will not be suitable in every situation. Consider, for example, a manufacturer
of home-use food storage containers that is in- danger of failing. Its sales are
declining steadily and its market share-approximately two percent of unit
and dollar sales of such products in New York and New Jersey-is already so
small that the market supplier has difficulty meeting expenses. The manufacturer's problem stems from a perceived deficiency in its product; consumers
believe that the containers are not airtight and, therefore, allow foods to spoil
rapidly. The lack of satisfaction accounts for the reduced sales because
consumers neither recommend the product to friends nor make repeat purchases. In actuality, the product, when used properly, creates a vacuum seal,
thereby retarding spoilage at least as effectively as products of like character
and quality.
The solution to the manufacturer's problem is to educate the consumer as to
the proper usage of the product. The only cost-effective method for accomplishing this task is a time-consuming demonstration by properly instructed
sales personnel. The market supplier has to rely upon the local dealers for
these demonstrations because it cannot afford television coverage of its entire
market. Without the capital to advertise effectively, the market supplier also
relies on dealers to generate product inquiries. Generally, a rather large point
of purchase display is best suited to this purpose. Past history indicates that
when retailers engage in local advertising, the market supplier's sales are,
boosted substantially.
Distribution has to be widespread for sales to reach significant proportions.
Market research indicates that most consumers purchase food containers
while shopping for other 'types of products, and that no one type of retail
outlet is associated with the sale of such products. Competitors, however,
enjoy broad market penetration. Therefore, the market supplier has to induce
its dealers to provide the necessary presale services crucial to the successful
marketing of its product. At the same time each dealer wants its investments
in promoting the product and educating consumers to be protected from free
riders.
Nonprice restraints would not accomplish these goals effectively. Granting
exclusive territories to protect dealers would deny the supplier the market
penetration required to stay in business. Location clauses would be meaningless, for if the supplier is to succeed, the locations would have to be too close
together. The dealer, therefore, would have no protection from free riders.
Customer allocation would also be impracticable because consumers tend to
shop in different locations: some shop near their homes; others go to business
districts; and still others frequent shopping centers. Yet, all of these people
could live on the same block. Profit pass-over clauses, whereby a dealer
selling to an out-of-territory customer compensates the dealer from whose
territory the customer comes, would fail in this type of marketing situation
because the administrative problems in tracing customers would be overwhelming.
Therefore, the supplier elects a resale price maintenance plan because it
would encourage dealers to provide sales services while protecting them at the
same time against free-rider incursion. The more services the dealers offer,
the more likely they will generate sales for themselves. Each dealer determines the amount of presale services it can afford, within the framework of
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the set retail price, to compete effectively on an intrabrand level. As a result
of the dealers' newly found enthusiasm after the supplier initiates the price
restraints, output increases so that in two years the supplier has captured a
five percent market share in terms of both dollars and unit sales.
5.

Application of the Rule of Reason Analysis

Market power: The relevant market consists of all brands of home-use food
storage containers sold in New York or New Jersey. At the time the
restrictions were implemented by the market supplier, it had a two percent
share of unit and dollar sales, which had been declining steadily. There are no
other manifestations of market power. In fact, the brand's sales suffer from a
perceived defect.
Freedom of access to competitive goods: In the relevant market there are
numerous suppliers of products of like character and quality, many of which
have widespread market distribution. Most dealers carry more than one brand
of these products, and the market supplier has not insisted upon exclusive
dealing arrangements.
Economic justifications: Dealers are limited as to the amount they can
charge for the market supplier's product. They are entitled, however, to sell
from any location in which they operate a business and to whomever they
choose. The restriction as to price was interposed to ensure that certain sales
services essential to the success of the product are offered. Although competition is not aggressive, there are ample substitute products available. Given
the proximity of one dealer to another, there is a substantial free-rider threat.
The dealers have not coerced the market supplier, who was in no position
to coerce the dealers. As a result of the restrictions, the market supplier
captured a five percent market share of both dollar and unit sales, thereby
increasing its output substantially.
Excessiveness of restraints: Because of the significant free-rider problem
and the crucial need for sales services, some type of restraint was necessary to
protect dealers and to ensure that those services would be provided. Resale
price maintenance would logically serve as an inducement to dealers to try to
maximize sales by offering services to consumers and would protect against
free-rider incursion. In light of these economic justifications, it can readily be
stated that the means were reasonably calculated to achieve the desired end.
Furthermore, because dealers were not precluded from obtaining available
competing goods, the restriction was not excessive. In fact, it is difficult to
conceive of any other solution available to this manufacturer and within its
means.
Discussion: The restrictions in this hypothetical should withstand rule of
reason scrutiny. This market supplier can be categorized as a failing firm. As
was the case in Sylvania, the market supplier's withdrawal would have
impaired interbrand competition. 30 7 The ready availability of substitute
products was accelerating the decline of the market supplier's sales. Imposition of price restrictions to induce dealers to provide services caused the
supplier's market share to increase. The absence of coercion is also an
important indication of competitive intent.
307.
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CONCLUSION

The Sylvania decision may mark a bold first step in the break away from
the formalistic approach evident in the majority of antitrust precedent concerning distribution restrictions. Throughout antitrust history, courts have
developed generic distinctions in an apparent attempt to pigeonhole restrictions on distribution into one of two broad categories: those that are per se
unlawful and those that must be tested for reasonableness. 30 8 Thus, by the
time Sylvania came before the Court, all distribution restraints that were
essentially horizontal, most vertical practices that involved price fixing or
price maintenance, 30 9 and all vertical nonprice restrictions imposed in a sale
after title had passed were automatically thrown into the per se category.
Sylvania, however, eliminated Schwinn's sales-agency distinction in cases
of vertical territorial restraints and ruled that all vertical nonprice restraints
should be tested under a rule of reason.3 10 Although the Sylvania rationale is
arguably applicable to vertical resale price maintenance, 3 11 the Court nevertheless said in dicta that all such practices are per se unlawful. 31 2 Finally, the
Court said that all horizontal restrictions were to remain in the per se
category. 313 Thus, the case that decried formalistic distinctions 3 14 preserved
them at the same time.
The danger of retaining these distinctions is that practices can be, and are,
deemed to be per se unlawful simply because of their form, even if all parties
admit that the practices are in fact procompetitive. The failing of these
simplistic distinctions giving rise to the per se rule, however, is that they have
not provided meaningful guidelines to businessmen as to the scope of legal
conduct because the boundaries between the distinctions are somewhat
amorphous.3 15 Thus, although it may be true that certain practices affect
competition so perniciously that they are inherently unlawful, the judicial
system has not yet found a satisfactory test for separating procompetitive
practices from inherently anticompetitive ones.
One might ask, then, why Sylvania is so important if its dicta preserve the
bulk of the formalistic distinctions previously used to decide cases involving
restrictions on distribution. For one, the decision saved the rule of reason
from almost total elimination. 3 16 Moreover, the Court recognized, at least in
principle, that deviation from the rule of reason standard is permissible only
on a showing of a demonstrable or pernicious effect on competition.3 17 In so
308. See pt. I(C) supra.
309. Price restrictions imposed pursuant to a consignment plan had been upheld if there was
no coercion. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
310. 433 U.S. at 58-59, discussed at notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
311. See notes 303-05 supra and accompanying text. The effect of Sylvania, however, may be
to break down the sales-consignment distinction in price maintenance cases as well, making all
such restrictions unlawful.
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314.
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433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
Id. at 58 n.28.
"We are unable to perceive significant social gain from channeling transactions into one
another." Id. at 58 n.29.
See notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 131-34 supra and accompanying text.

433 U.S. at 58-59.
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doing, the Court reestablished the rule of reason as the standard method of
analysis and the per se rule as the exception. At the same time, it directed
judicial inquiry to competitive impact rather than form, even when determining whether to apply a per se rule or a rule of reason.
At present, these practical effects of Sylvania will have an impact only on
vertical territorial restraints. 318 Defendants will have the opportunity to
justify their restrictions on the basis of market pressures to which the
defendants reacted. It is suggested that, at least in the case of vertical
nonprice restraints, courts balance this evidence under the rule of reason test
proposed above. With a test that focuses the court's attention on market
power, freedom of access to competitive goods, economic justifications, and
the excessiveness of the restraint, a body of case law should evolve that will in
time provide meaningful guidelines to businessmen trying to compete fairly
yet aggressively in a complex market. In addition, the proposed test is
functional in that its application does not automatically result in a finding of
legality, and because it is designed to distinguish procompetitive and anticompetitive practices.
The unfortunate probability arising from Sylvania is that many plaintiffs
will continue to force their challenges into the per se categories retained by
Sylvania in an attempt to obtain a sure victory. 3 19 Acceptance of the dealerservices theory, however, paves the way for abolition of the per se categories
of horizontal restraints and resale price maintenance schemes. On the basis of
this theory, which adequately explains the purpose and competitive effects of
certain practices, courts should be able to recognize, without being strapped
by formal labels, that a group of small manufacturers may have the same
interest in imposing restraints to obtain dealer services as does a single large
manufacturer and that, in many situations, resale price maintenance may be
preferable to territorialism. As the judicial system becomes more comfortable
with a functional rule of reason-one that is not synonymous with per se
legality-it is hoped that these other per se precedents left intact by Sylvania
will fall.
B. J. Douek
318. Id. at 55-56.
319. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.

